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COMMENT
The Third Generation of Loitering Laws Goes to Court: Do
Laws That Criminalize "Loitering With the Intent to Sell
Drugs" Pass Constitutional Muster?
I.

INTRODUCTION

Citizens across the country fear drugs and those who deal them.
According to at least one prominent politician, drug dealers should be
put in concentration camps. 1 This attitude toward the growing drug
problem is widely held.2 As drug abuse has increased in this country,
politicians frantically have sought for ways to nip the growth in the bud.3
One increasingly popular strategy has been to arrest drug dealers before
their merchandise reaches the street. In pursuit of this goal, legislators
have enacted laws forbidding "loitering with the intent to sell drugs." 4
These laws identify and criminalize the activity of drug dealers before
they have a chance to sell any drugs,5 in effect giving police authority to
predict which citizens "are to become future criminals." 6
Despite their apparent usefulness, these new loitering laws represent
a clear departure from longstanding constitutional principles which forbid laws that criminalize mere suspicion of future unlawful conduct.7
All criminal laws must include some criminal act, or actus reus.8 Loitering laws make the constitutionally protected activity of loitering the actus reus of the crime; there is no forbidden criminal act.9 Similarly,
federal courts also have struck down loitering statutes as unconstitu1. Jim Morrill, Myrick's Legacy Mixed, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Dec. 1, 1991, at lA,
8A (citing Sue Myrick, former mayor of Charlotte, North Carolina).
2. After declaring her "war on drugs," Sue Myrick proposed drug testing, concentration

camps for drug dealers, and armed military police at high schools. Id. at 8A. Others have
echoed Myrick's views, which have earned her rumors "in Republican circles to be a candidate

to replace drug-policy chief William Bennett." Id.
3. See, e.g., id. Such efforts have not always been successful, however. After Myrick
declared war on drugs, violent crime increased 52% during her first three years in office. Id.

4. See, ag., CHARLOTTE, N.C., CODE § 15-31 (1990); FAYETTEVILLE, N.C., CODE
§ 21-55(c)(5) (1989); GREENSBORO, N.C., CODE § 18-46 (1989); HIGH POINT, N.C., CODE
§ 12-1-9 (1989).
5. Many city ordinances equate activity such as loitering on public property in high
crime areas with manifesting an intent to sell drugs in the future. See supra note 4.
6. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 171 (1972).
7. See id. at 169.
8. See Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971).
9. See, eg., id.; Sawyer v. Sandstrom, 615 F.2d 311, 316 (5th Cir. 1980); Waters v.
McGuriman, 656 F. Supp. 923, 926 (E.D. Pa. 1987); see also Papachristou,405 U.S. at 164
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tional on the grounds of vagueness and on Fourth Amendment
principles.'"

Nevertheless, loitering with intent statutes and ordinances have been
recently enacted in several North Carolina cities.11 When a criminal law
forgoes the requirement of an actus reus, it may run afoul of the United

States Constitution in several respects. First, the laws may infringe the
First Amendment right of association.

2

They also may fail to provide

adequate notice to police and citizens of what behavior is criminal,
thereby chilling innocent activity and possibly encouraging arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement by the police.

3

Finally, they may facilitate

circumvention of the Fourth Amendment's probable
cause requirement
4

by allowing police to search "suspicious" citizens.'
Furthering the impact of these new laws, their enactment coincides
with interpretations of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments that afford

criminal defendants little protection."' Courts that once invalidated loitering laws may respond differently now that such laws are drug-related

loitering laws, and not just vagrancy laws regulating "bums."'

6

If courts

do uphold such laws, the police will have greater freedom from the restrictive constitutional principles under which they traditionally have operated. 7 At issue is whether this greater freedom violates the

Constitution.
In Parts II and III, this Comment provides a brief overview of the

history of loitering laws and discusses specifically how laws prohibiting
"loitering with the intent to sell drugs" evolved from previous vagrancy
("The difficulty is that [walking, strolling, and wandering] are historically part of the amenities
of life as we have known them.").
10. See infra notes 96-137 and accompanying text.
11. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 148-243 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 244-316 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 317-408 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 338-55 and accompanying text.
16. In Kalamazoo, Michigan, "[c]ourtroom spectators cheered.., as a judge upheld an
anti-loitering ordinance designed to rid streets of drug dealers." Judge Upholds Law Targeting
Drug Dealers, WASH. TIMES, July 19, 1989, at Al. One judge, facing overwhelming public
outcry against drugs, said that Kalamazoo had a "'compelling interest to stem the flow of
drugs' that outweighed any potential infringement on the right of people to associate with drug
dealers." Id. (quoting District Judge Quinn Benson).
17. When the Elgin, Illinois city council was debating whether to pass a "loitering with
intent to sell drugs" law, Police Chief Charles Gruber exemplified the new trend by saying,
"There might be some bleeding-heart liberal out there who doesn't like it, but that's too
bad.... We've got real problems and we've got to find new and creative ways to deal with
them." Colin McMahon, Elgin to Deal With Lingering Evils: ProposedLoiteringLaw Aimed
at Drugs and Prostitutes, CHI. TRIB., May 22, 1991, at 6.
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laws.18 Part IV examines a typical "loitering with the intent to sell
drugs" law, how and where such a law is enforced, and how the judicial
system has reacted to such a law.1 9 Part V offers a doctrinal discussion
of the three main constitutional issues implicated by loitering laws: over-

breadth, vagueness, and the Fourth Amendment.20 Part VI asks whether
any loitering law can survive constitutional scrutiny. 21 This Comment

concludes by questioning whether the war on drugs is exacting too high a
price by eroding traditional individual freedoms. 22
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF LOITERING LAWS

Societies have had loitering laws for over one thousand years.23
English vagrancy laws, the precursors to modem loitering statutes, existed as long ago as the reign of King Ine in 700 A.D.2 4 English royalty

first designed these "poor laws" in the seventh century 25 in an attempt to
keep peasants from leaving their feudal lords. 26 Despite vigorous enforcement of the poor laws, the feudal system deteriorated, and serfs began to leave their fiefs in search of higher wages.2 7 Severe labor shortages
resulted.
In response to this migration, the sovereign enacted other similar
laws designed to maintain the social order.28 These efforts proved futile,
however. A violent outbreak of the bubonic plague ravaged England in
1348,29 killing much of the work force. 30 By 1349, King Edward III
responded with the Statute of Labourers, the first "fully fledged vagrancy
See infra notes 23-68 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 69-140 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 141-408 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 409-17 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 418-23 and accompanying text.
C. J. RIBTON-TURNER, A HISTORY OF VAGRANTS AND VAGRANCY AND BEGGARS
AND BEGGING 7 (1887).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. King Ine imposed severe penalties on those who wandered away from their lord:
"If any one go from his lord without leave, or steal himself away into another shire, and he be
discovered, let him go where he was before, and pay to his lord LX [60] shillings." Id. (quoting LAWS OF KING INE, ch. 39, 688-725 (Eng.)). In this period, one shilling was worth approximately the value of a cow. Id. Penalties also applied to those who harbored vagrants.
Id. at 6-7.
27. Jordan Berns, Comment, Is There Something Suspicious About the Constitutionalityof
Loitering Laws?, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 717, 717-18 (1989).
28. Id.
29. RIBTON-TURNER, supra note 23, at 42-43.
30. Id.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
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statute."'3 1 The Statute of Labourers was designed to force peasants to
work,32 but it was ineffective in mitigating labor shortages.33
After this futile attempt to use vagrancy laws to control the labor
market, 34 these laws were redirected toward crime prevention. 35 The
Crown believed that people without visible means of employment were
more likely to be involved in criminal activity. 36 Harsh penalties, includ-

ing whipping the offender and cutting off his ear, were imposed on those
caught loitering for the second time.37 Vagrancy laws permitted police to
round up large numbers of people, determine which were criminals, and
release the rest.38 One such law stated that "[o]fficers of cities are authorized to direct searches by night for ruffelers, sturdy vagabonds, and
valiant beggars, and all persons are required to assist in such searches. ' 39
Little changed in the New World.' For centuries in America, police found loitering laws useful tools for keeping undesirables off the
31. Peter Archard, Vagrancy-a LiteratureReview, in VAGRANCY, SOME NEW PERSPECTivEs 11, 17 (Tim Cook ed., 1979).
32. RIBTON-TURNER, supra note 23, at 42-47. The Statute of Labourers stated:
Because a great part of the people, and especially of workmen and servants, late died
of the pestilence, many seeing the necessity of masters and great scarcity of servants,
will not serve unless they may receive excessive wages, and some rather willing to beg
in idleness than by labour to get their living . . . . That if a workman or servant
depart from service before the time agreed upon, he shall be imprisoned.
Statute of Labourers, 1378, 2 Rich. 2, stat. 1, ch. 8 (Eng.), cited in RIBTON-TURNER, supra
note 23, at 43-44.
Scholars have noted a variety of factors, in addition to the Black Death, which contributed to the enactment of these laws: "the demobilization of soldiers after the Wars of the
Roses, the rising population, unemployment and economic depression arising out of the fall in
the demand for textiles, inflation, the enclosure of common agricultural land, harvest failures,
and the dissolution of the monasteries." Archard, supra note 31, at 18.
33. The 1349 Act proved futile in regulating the flow or wages of laborers. RIBTONTURNER, supra note 23, at 46.
34. Id.
35. Archard, supra note 31, at 18. Vagrants were deemed gypsies in a 1530 Act; these
vagrants were presumptively guilty of every crime from murder to crimes that were "to the
high displeasure of God." RIBTON-TURNER, supra note 23, at 72-73 (quoting Vagrancy Act,
1530, 22 Hen. 8, ch. 12 (Eng.)).
36. Archard, supranote 31, at 18. By 1535, vagrancy laws had taken a new direction; the
new statutes controlled repeat offenders. Id. The new laws were "explicitly designed to protect the property of commercial travellers in a society increasingly developing its commercial
and industrial infra-structures." Id.
37. RiBTON-TURNER, supra note 23, at 82.

38. Id.
39. Id.
40. The English vagrancy laws served as models for the loitering laws enacted in the
United States. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 161 (1972). Some statutes even contained the same language as the old English laws. Id. at 161-62.
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streets.41 Those violating the loitering laws were guilty only of arousing
the suspicion of police officers.4 2 For example, a police officer could
arrest a vagrant for the crime of making an officer uncomfortable by his
presence.43 Almost all of these first generation loitering laws, however,
were held to be vague and were invalidated by the United States Supreme
Court in the 1960s and 1970s. 4 The Court held that the vagrancy laws
were so vague that ordinary citizens could not know what activity constituted a crime and that police could enforce these laws in an arbitrary and
discriminatory manner.4 5
Lawmakers responded to the Supreme Court's admonition by requiring a specific intent to engage in an unlawful activity.4 6 By adding a
mens rea element, legislators hoped to wrap the same unconstitutional
law in a prettier package that was more likely to receive judicial sanction. 47 The first of these laws to gain popularity sought to lessen the
standard for arresting prostitutes 8 by criminalizing "loitering with the
intent to solicit prostitution." 49 The laws were a response to the difficulty prosecutors had in convicting prostitutes 0 because the police rarely
41. See id. at 171 ("Of course, vagrancy statutes are useful to the police. Of course, they
are nets making easy the roundup of so-called undesirables."); United States ex reL Newsome
v. Malcolm, 492 F.2d 1166, 1171 (2d Cir. 1974) ("[The loitering statute] represented New
York's formulation of a dragnet approach to the maintenance of public order that had its roots
in feudal England and which has survived, despite considerable disapproval, in urban
America."), aff'd sub nor. Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975).
42. See Powell v. Stone, 507 F.2d 93, 96 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that vagrancy statutes
"authorize arrest and conviction for conduct that is no more than suspicious"), rev'd on other
grounds, 428 U.S. 465 (1975).
43. See JACKSONVILLE, FLA., ORDINANCE CODE § 26-57 (1965), quoted in Papachristou,
405 U.S. at 156-57 n.1.
44. See, e.g., Papachristou,405 U.S. at 169-71.
45. Id. at 170.
46. See, e.g., CHARLOTrE, N.C., CODE § 15-31 (1990) (loitering for the purpose of engaging in drug-related activity); GREENSBORO, N.C., CODE § 18-46 (1989) (same); HIGH POINT,
N.C., CODE § 12-1-9 (1989) (same).
47. See McMahon, supra note 17, at 6.
48. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-204.1 (1979).
49. See, e.g., id.
50. In People v. Williams, 55 Misc. 2d 774, 775, 286 N.Y.S.2d 575, 577 (N.Y. Crim. Ct.
1967), the court commented:
These defendants are 41 of a group of alleged prostitutes who have been arrested and
detained 2500 times for disorderly conduct and loitering in New York City since
August 18th.... This Court of its own knowledge is aware that except for a few
isolated instances where defendants pleaded guilty, the... cases were dismissed. In
many instances, "the girls" were arrested after 11:30 P.M., too late to be arraigned,
night court had been adjourned, then kept overnight in a cell. In the morning they
were brought to Court and released because the offenses for which they had been
arrested could not be proven to have been committed by them.
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could catch prostitutes in the act.51 This second generation of loitering
laws went largely unnoticed, however, because it was extremely narrow

in scope,5 2 police were careful to apply it only to prostitutes, and those
prosecuted rarely appealed because, by the time of the trial, most had
been released from jail on time served.53
III.

THE WAR ON DRUGS

Widespread illegal drug use has spawned cries for effective solu-

tions. Consider the responses of two jurors after acquitting six police
officers for the killing of a drug dealer: 4 "[The victim was] only a drug
dealer anyway," 5 and "the guy was an out-and-out drug dealer-probably got what he deserved anyway." 5 6 These statements illustrate soci-

ety's disdain
for affording drug dealers constitutionally protected
7
5

rights.

Unlike the above-mentioned case, most alleged civil rights violations
fueled by the war on drugs involve criminal defendants accused of using
drugs.58 People generally are not sympathetic towards a defendant acId. (quoted in United States ex rel. Newsome v. Malcolm, 492 F.2d 1166, 1173 (2d Cir. 1974),
aff'd sub nom. Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975)).
51. See generally JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHouT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 96-109 (2d. ed. 1975) (detailing the various ways in which
prostitutes avoid arrest).
52. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.37 (McKinney 1976).
53. See, e.g., Dominguez v. Beame, 603 F.2d 337, 339 (2d Cir. 1979) (observing that the

District Attorney dropped all charges against women accused of prostitution after they had

spent one night in jail).
54. Andy Court, UnreasonableDoubt, AM. LAW., Apr. 1991, at 76. In the trial of six

police officers, the government's case was weakened by the legally irrelevant fact that the victim was a drug dealer. Counsel for the defense successfully painted the trial as a battle between good and evil: "Ladies and gentlemen, this is a trial about a single battle in the war on
drugs." Id. The jury subsequently acquitted the police officers of all homicide charges and of
charges of conspiring to deprive the drug dealer of his civil rights. Id. The jurors probably did
not want to send veteran officers to jail for killing a drug dealer. As Herbert Ross, one of the
jurors, stated, "I've heard a little too much [about] civil rights in my lifetime. I feel that
criminals give their civil rights away when they elect to lead a life of crime." Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. There was overwhelming evidence that four Miami police officers beat Leonardo
Mercado to death while he lay defenseless, curled on the ground. Id.
57. Drug Czar William Bennett explained his position in his nomination hearings before
the Senate Judiciary Committee, stating that he favored limiting constitutional liberties if there
were" 'compelling reasons' to do so in the war on drugs." Douglas Jehl, Bennett Would Limit
Rights in War on Drugs, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1989, § 1, at 1. Bennett also reasoned that the
"Constitution is not a suicide pact. Lincoln did suspend habeas corpus rights, and I don't
think that was a terrible thing to do." Id.
58. The most visible abuses of rights in the war on drugs come from police. This Comment focuses on the opportunity for police abuses created by loitering laws. This does not
mean, however, that the criminal justice system is free from abuse after the courts take over.
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cused of a drug-related offense 9 and fear that the drug problem will
spread, further infecting mainstream families.6" Even moderate political
groups now believe the drug problem is so urgent that some individual
rights must be sacrificed in order to fight the war on drugs. 6 Without
tough drug laws, law enforcement officers often feel powerless to combat
increasing drug use.62
One judge, prompted by an overwhelming public outcry, stated that
Kalamazoo, Michigan had a "'compelling interest to stein the flow of
In today's courtrooms, according to Kevin Zeese, vice president of the Drug Policy Foundation, " '[v]irtually all of the first ten [amendments] have been greatly abridged by the drug war,
and I don't see an end to it.'" Dawn M. Weyrich, Drug War Alarms Civil Libertarians,
WASH. TIMEs, Sept. 5, 1990, at Al.
59. There is a pervasive sense of civic responsibility to get tough on drug-related crime.
James Neuhard, a member of the American Bar Association's Task Force on the Crisis in the
Court System, compares the drug war mentality to McCarthyism. See Michael Tackett, Drug
War Chokes FederalCourts: Assembly-line Justice PerilsLegal System, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 14,
1990, at Cl, C5.
60. Susan Beck et a]., The Cocaine War in America's Fruitbowl, AM. LAW., Mar. 1990, at
82, 84. Richard Kayne, Washington state court-appointed counsel for drug defendants, admitted that "[d]rugs have become such a bugaboo that people are willing to trade almost anything
to get rid of them." Id. In Yakima, Washington, all public schools participate in a
somewhat Orwellian program called SAFE, or Student Assistance For Everyone.
Every school day about a dozen students there attend an elective class in staying off
drugs. Each of these students has already had a 'caring confrontation' with a member of the school's 'care team,' which was notified of the student's suspicious behavior by a teacher or fellow student. After the confrontation, the student was referred
for treatment.
Id. at 84-85. The care team consists of teachers, counselors, and other students known as
"natural helpers." Id. at 85. The natural helpers report the names of those of their peers who

show signs of drug behavior. Id.
In a letter to the editor, one citizen of Seattle voiced the rage that ordinary people have
against drug-related crime. "The police must have more power in dealing with these drug
dealing mutants who take over our city streets, terrorizing the families, senior citizens and
children who live there." Patti Whitehead-Crooks, SEATTLE TIMEs, July 5, 1990, at All.
61. A new group of scholars and activists have started a movement called "communitarianism." Alvin P. Sanoff & Ted Gest, Battling the Rights Wings: A New Movement Brings
Back an Old Word: Responsibility, U.S. NEWS & WORLD RuP., Nov. 25, 1991, at 28. This
movement asserts that "politics has gone astray by catering to rampant individualism while
virtually ignoring citizens' responsibilities to the wider community." Id. A wide circle of
moderate politicians espousing communitarian ideas includes President Bill Clinton, Virginia
Governor Douglas Wilder, New York Governor Mario Cuomo, and some of former President
George Bush's aides. Id. One of the movement's key platforms is to give police "broader
powers to arrest suspected dealers and to enforce anti-loitering laws to break up drug-sales
operations." Id.
62. Drug dealers have learned to avoid police prosecution under current drug laws. Interview with Stephanie Webster, police attorney, in Charlotte, N.C. (Nov. 1991). Loitering with
the intent to sell drugs laws are designed to catch dealers who exchange drugs and money in
discreet ways. Id. Drugs often come in small packets which are exchanged through handshakes. Id. It is both difficult and resource-exhausting for the police to use existing drug laws
under these circumstances. Id.

520
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drugs' that outweighed any potential infringement on the right of people

to associate with drug dealers."6 3 Due to community pressures, alleged
drug users are unlikely to receive impartial treatment at the hands of the
criminal justice system.

The third generation of loitering laws arose out of this dismal environment.64 Public pressure to support the war on drugs has caused politicians to enact harsh laws against drug-related activity. Consequently,

local governments have empowered police to arrest people who look or
act like drug users or sellers through new "loitering with the intent to sell

drugs" laws. 6 Lawmakers expected that adding an intent requirement
63. Judge Upholds Law Targeting Drug Dealers, WASH. TIMEs, July 19, 1989, at Al
(quoting District Judge Quinn Benson).
64. Responding to a court decision to strike down Alexandria, Virginia's 'loitering with
the intent to sell drugs' law, Mayor James P. Moran, Jr. remarked that the "worst setback is to
the lawful citizens living in these drug-infested neighborhoods, who are in desperate need of
support from the criminal justice system. And instead, the criminal justice system continues to
look for ways to protect the drug dealer." Robert F. Howe, Alexandria Statute on Loitering
Upset, WASH. PoST, Sept. 28, 1990, at Dl.
65. Judge William Schwarzer, director of the Federal Judicial Center, summed up the
situation:
The popular political apparatus cries for harsher and harsher attacks for people involved with drugs and for more involvement of the courts. We get this blind, emotional commitment without looking at the facts and assume any war that the U.S.
gets into it will automatically win.... I don't consider the courts a place to fight a
war.
Tackett, supra note 59, at C5. As in any war, citizens are asked to make sacrifices toward the
war effort. Former President Gerald Ford, commenting on the sacrifices that need to be made
in the war on drugs, reflected a common feeling among the populous: "It is vital that we
cooperate [in the drug war] over and above any rights that we have." Ford'sIdea for War on
Drugs one Step Beyond Reagan's, UPI, Sept. 16, 1986, available in LExIs, Nexis Library, UPI
File.
In fact, a recent study shows that a clear majority of Americans are willing to suspend the
Constitution until the war on drugs is won. "Criminal Justice in Crisis," a study conducted by
an ABA committee consisting of federal judges, state attorneys general, district attorneys, and
police chiefs found that 62% of Americans would give up their rights to stop illegal drug use,
id. at 21 (citing Criminal Justice in Crisis, 1988 A.B.A. CRIM. JuST. SEc. REP.); but "the
public has been misinformed. The public believes that if they give up their own rights, they
can trade them for a solution to the drug problem." Id.
There is not really a tradeoff, but there is tremendous pressure to do something in the war
on drugs. As a result, "police [and prosecutors] have engaged in fruitless activity." Id. at 23.
Prosecutors and judges, who are often elected, are forced to show they are tough on crime, but
these efforts "are merely efforts to placate the public." Id. Unfortunately these 'battles' are all
for show; in reality, fighting drugs through the criminal justice system is, as one police chief
said, "like trying to bail out the Atlantic Ocean with a teaspoon." Id. at 20. In fact,
"[i]nvoking the metaphors and images of battle, the government's 'war on drugs' has already
made casualties of constitutional protections and personal dignity." United States v. Salas, 879

F.2d 530, 541 (9th Cir. 1989) (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
66. A typical "loitering with intent to sell drugs" law still allows arrests based on suspicion where "such person behaves in such a manner as to raise a reasonable suspicion that he or
she is about to engage in or is engaging in an unlawful drug-related activity." FAYETTEVILLE,
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and the magic word "drugs" would insulate the third generation of loitering laws from constitutional challenge.67 Law enforcement agencies
were pleased to have a new tool to combat drug dealers, but the question

remained:

Was this new tool merely another unconstitutional

"broom," 68 a third generation of street-sweeping loitering laws?
IV.

LOITERING WITH INTENT

As courts struck down this third generation of loitering laws, legislative bodies enacted new, more narrow laws to avoid the constitutional
problems that plagued the previous laws. Although some city councils
have already proposed and passed some "fourth generation" loitering

laws addressing "unauthorized persons on parking lots"69 or "begging
without a permit,"7 0 this Comment will focus primarily on "loitering for
N.C., CODE § 21-55(c)(5) (1989); see

GREENSBORO, N.C., CODE § 18-46(b)(4) (1989); HIGH
PoINT, N.C., CODE § 12-1-9(b)(4) (1989); see also Beck et al., supranote 60, at 82 (stating that
such local ordinances give police broad powers to stop and question people, thereby allowing
them to build up probable cause "in a stair-step fashion").
67. The third generation loitering laws make arrests, though not convictions, just as easy
to accomplish as did the old loitering laws, because the police officer on the beat is given the
discretion to decide who he thinks intends to sell drugs. See CHARLOTTE, N.C., CODE § 15-31
(1990); FAYETrEVILLE, N.C., CODE § 21-55(c) (1989); GREENSBORO, N.C., CODE § 18-46(b)
(1989); HIGH POINT, N.C., CODE § 12-1-9(b) (1989).
68. Beck et al., supra note 60, at 82.
69. Charlotte officials are considering adopting a law modeled after an Atlanta, Georgia
ordinance concerning "unauthorized persons on parking lots." See ATLANTA, GA., ORDINANCE § 17-1007 (1991). The proposed Charlotte ordinance reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person to remain on any property which is used primarily
as a parking lot for vehicles unless such person has a vehicle parked on the property,
or has other lawful business on said property; provided, such property is prominently
marked by a posted notice which is easily seen from a distance of fifty feet which
states substantially as follows: "No Person shall remain on any property which is
used primarily as a parking lot for vehicles unless such person has a vehicle parked
on the property, or is employed by the owner or manager of the property, or has
lawful business on said property."
CHARLOTTE, N.C., CODE § 15-11 (Proposed Official Draft 1991). However, it would be difficult for police to tell whether someone owned a car in a parking lot or whether he was there
for "lawful business."
70. A proposed Charlotte ordinance attempts to use the city bureaucracy to deter begging. See CHARLOTrE, N.C., CODE § 15-24 (Proposed Official Draft 1991). This proposed
ordinance makes it entirely possible that a person may wait longer to obtain a permit than the
time he actually is allowed to use it. Although the permit lasts only three months, the application process takes one month to complete:
(a) Permit required.
(1) It shall be unlawful for any person to beg or solicit alms or contributions, which
include money or other things of value, from the public, on the public streets or other
public property, without first obtaining a permit in the manner set forth in this
ordinance.
(2) Any person desiring to beg or solicit alms or charitable contributions on the
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the purpose of engaging in drug-related activity" and, to a lesser degree,
on "loitering with the intent to solicit prostitution."
A.

Typical 'oitering

With Intent" Laws: North Carolina Ordinances

Although Charlotte was not the first city in North Carolina to pass
a drug-related loitering ordinance, it may have the most street-level drug

activity because it is the state's largest city. Charlotte's ordinance, the
product of a combined effort by North Carolina police attorneys to create
a constitutional "loitering with intent" law, is generally representative of
the other city ordinances in North Carolina. The ordinance reads as
follows:
(a) Definitions. For the purpose of this section, the following
definitions shall apply:
(1) Known unlawful drug user, possessor or seller: A person
who has been convicted in any court within this state of any
crime involving the use, possession or sale of any substance referred to in the North Carolina Controlled Substances Act,
Chapter 90, Article 5, of the North Carolina General Statutes
or has been convicted of any violation of any substantially similar law of any other state or of the United States.
(2) Public Place: Any public street, public highway, public
sidewalk, public vehicular area,.., public park and/or plaza,
other publicly owned or leased property, public transportation
facility, school and school grounds or property, common areas
of apartment and condominium communities, common areas of
public housing projects, any place of business or amusement
which is open to the public, any private property which adjoins
any of the above-described areas and to which the public has
ready access, any other property which is open to the public,
whether publicly or privately owned, and any motor vehicle in
or on the above-described areas.
(3) Repeatedly: Three (3) or more times.
public streets or other public property shall file with the City Manager an application
for a permit, which application shall state the name of the applicant, the purpose for
which the applicant intends to beg or solicit alms or charitable contributions, and the
manner in which any property received as a result of such begging or solicitation is to
be disbursed. The applicant shall also certify that such begging or solicitation will be
conducted in a manner allowed pursuant to Section (b) of this ordinance. Upon
receipt of a completed application and certification, the City Manager shall issue a
permit to the applicant within four weeks of such receipt with such reasonable time,
place and manner restrictions as are appropriate in the particular circumstances

presented by the applicant and in light of the interests of public safety, peace, com.
fort and convenience. Such permits shall be valid for a period not exceeding three
months.
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(b) Prohibited; violation determination. It shall be unlawful
for a person to remain or wander about in'a public place for the
purpose of engaging in a violation of any provision of the North
Carolina Controlled Substances Act (North Carolina General
Statutes 90, Article 5). The following conduct or factors can be
considered in determining whether a person is remaining or
wandering in a public place for the purpose of violating any
provision of N.C.G.S. 90, Article 5:
(1) Repeatedly beckoning to, stopping or attempting to stop
passersby or attempting to engage passersby in conversation; or
(2) Repeatedly stopping or attempting to stop motor vehicles;
or
(3) Repeatedly interfering with the free passage of other persons; or
(4) Being a known unlawful user, possessor or seller; or
(5) Repeatedly passing to or receiving from passersby,
whether on foot or in a vehicle, money or objects; or
(6) Attempting to flee or evade a police officer; or
(7) Being at a location frequented by persons who use, possess
or sell controlled substances; or
(8) Occupying a vehicle which is registered to a known unlawful drug user, possessor or seller or which has been recently
involved in illegal drug-related activity; or
(9) Stopping, conversing with the occupant(s) of, handing
money or any object to the occupant(s) of or receiving money
or any object from the occupant(s) of a vehicle which is registered to a known unlawful drug user, possessor or seller or
which has been recently involved in illegal drug-related
activity.
(c) Possible arrest;penalty. No arrest or charge is permitted
hereunder unless the circumstances establish probable cause to
believe that the person intended to violate one (1) or more of
the provisions of N.C.G.S. 90, Article 5. A violation of any
provision of this section shall subject the offender to the penal-

ties set forth in section 1-7 of the city Code.
(d) Severability. If any subsection, paragraph, sentence,
clause, phrase or portion of this section is for any reason held
invalid or unconstitutional by any court of competent jurisdiction, such portion shall be deemed severable, and such holding
shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions hereof.7 1
Three similar ordinances have been enacted in other North Carolina
cities. The first type, enacted in Greensboro and High Point, parallels
71. CHARLOTTE, N.C., CODE § 15-31 (1990).
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the Charlotte ordinance, 72 except that section (a) does not include a defi-

nition of "known drug user" or "repeatedly," and the definition for
"public place" is slightly different; section (b) requires that each circumstance used to manifest intent be for the purpose of violating North Carolina drug laws; section (b)(4) replaces being a "known drug" offender

with "[s]uch person behaves in such a manner as to raise a reasonable
suspicion that he or she is about to engage in or is engaging in an unlawful drug-related activity"; and sections (b)(8) and (b)(9) of the Charlotte

ordinance, concerning vehicles involved in drug trade, as well as section
(c), which concerns probable cause, are omitted.

The second type of ordinance, enacted in Fayetteville, is also similar
to the Charlotte ordinance. 73 Like the High Point and Greensboro ordi72. HIGH POINT, N.C., CODE § 12-1-9 (1989); see supra note 71 and accompanying text.
The High Point ordinance provides:
(a) For the purpose of this section, "public place" means any area available to the
public for common usage and access, including any street, sidewalk, bridge, alley or
alleyway, plaza, park, playground, driveway, parking lot or transportation facility, or
the doorways, entranceways, stairway, staircase, hall, roof, elevator, courtyard, passageway or common area to any building which fronts on any of those places or any
motor vehicle in or on any of those places, or any property owned by the City....
(b) It shall be unlawful for a person to remain or wander about in a public place in
a manner and under circumstances manifesting the intent to engage in a violation of
any subdivision of the North Carolina Controlled Substances Act, N.C. General
Statutes Chapter 90, Article 5. Such circumstances shall include the following when
done for the purpose of violating the aforementioned state statutes:
(I) Repeatedly beckoning to, stopping, or attempting to stop passers-by, or
attempting to engage passers-by in conversation; or
(2) Repeatedly stopping or attempting to stop motor vehicles; or
(3) Repeatedly interfering with the free passage of other persons; or
(4) Such person behaves in such a manner as to raise a reasonable suspicion
that he or she is about to engage in or is engaging in an unlawful drug-related
activity; or
(5) Such person repeatedly passes to or receives from passers-by, whether on
foot, in a vehicle or by courier, money or objects; or
(6) Such person takes flight upon the approach or appearance of a law enforcement officer; or
(7) Such person is at a location frequented by persons who unlawfully use,
possess or sell drugs.
(c) All ordinances or parts of ordinances in conflict with this section are hereby
repealed to the extent of such conflict.
(d) If any subsection, paragraph, sentence, clause, phrase or portion of this section
is for any reason held invalid or unconstitutional by any court of competent jurisdiction, such portion shall be deemed severable, and such holding shall not affect the
validity of the remaining portions hereof.
HIGH POINT, N.C., CODE § 12-1-9 (1989); see GREENSBORO, N.C., CODE § 18-46 (1989).

73. FAYETTEVILLE, N.C., CODE § 21-55 (1989); see supra note 71 and accompanying

text. The Fayetteville ordinance provides:
(a) For the purpose of this section, "public place" means any street, sidewalk,
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nances, the Fayetteville ordinance allows police to find intent when
"[s]uch person behaves in such a manner as to raise a reasonable suspicion that he or she is about to engage in or is engaging in an unlawful
drug-related activity." 74 Unlike the High Point and Greensboro ordinances, but like Charlotte's, the Fayetteville ordinance requires only that
the circumstances, taken together, manifest intent to violate a drug law,7 5
not that each circumstance itself must be performed with the intent to
bridge, alley or alleyway, plaza, park, driveway, parking lot or transportation facility,
or the doorways and entranceways to any building which fronts on any of those
places, or a motor vehicle in or on any of those places, or any property owned by the
city.
(b) For the purposes of this section, a "known unlawful drug user, possessor, or
seller" is a person who has, within the knowledge of the arresting officer, been convicted in any court within this state of any violation involving the use, possession or
sale of any of the substances referred to in the North Carolina Controlled Substances
Act, Chapter 90, Article 5 of the North Carolina General Statutes, or has been convicted of any violation of any substantially similar laws of any political subdivision of
this state or of any other state or of federal law.
(c) It shall be unlawful for a person to remain or wander about in a public place in
a manner and under circumstances manifesting the purpose to engage in a violation
of any subdivision of the North Carolina Controlled Substances Act, North Carolina
General Statutes, Chapter 90 , Article 5. Such circumstances shall include:
(1) Repeatedly beckoning to, stopping, or attempting to stop passers-by, or
repeatedly attempting to engage passers-by in conversation; or
(2) Repeatedly stopping or attempting to stop motor vehicles; or
(3) Repeatedly interfering with the free passage of other persons; or
(4) Such person is a known unlawful drug user, possessor, or seller; or
(5) Such person behaves in such a manner as to raise a reasonable suspicion
that he or she is about to engage in or is engaged in an unlawful drug-related

activity; or
(6) Such person repeatedly passes to or receives from passers-by, whether on
foot or in a vehicle, money or objects; or
(7) Such person takes flight upon the approach or appearance of a police officer; or
(8) Such person is at a location frequented by persons who use, possess, or sell
drugs; or
(9) Any vehicle involved is registered to a known unlawful drug user, possessor, or seller, or is known to be or have been involved in drug-related activities.
(d) A violation of any provisions of this section shall subject the offender to the
penalties set forth in section 1-7 of this Code.
(e) If any section, paragraph, sentence, clause, phrase or portion of this section is
for any reason held invalid or unconstitutional by any court of competent jurisdiction, such portion shall be deemed severable and such holding shall not affect the
validity of the remaining portions hereof.
FAYETrEVILLE, N.C., CODE § 21-55 (1989).

74. FAYErEVILLE, N.C., CODE § 21-55(c)(5) (1989); see GREENSBORO, N.C., CODE
§ 18-46 (1989); HIGH POINT, N.C., CODE § 12-1-9 (1989).
75. See FAYETrEVILLE, N.C., CODE § 21-55 (1989); CHARLOTTE, N.C., CODE § 15-31
(1990).
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violate a drug law. 76 The Fayetteville ordinance requires also that the

arresting officer have knowledge at the time of arrest that a person is a

"known unlawful drug user." 77 Fayetteville's ordinance also replaces
sections (b)(8) and (b)(9) of the Charlotte ordinance with "[a]ny vehicle
involved is registered to a known unlawful drug user, possessor, or seller,
'78
or is known to be or have been involved in drug-related activities."
Fayetteville's ordinance omits section (c) of the Charlotte ordinance concerning probable cause.79
The third type of ordinance, enacted in Durham, is similar to North
Carolina's "loitering for the purpose of soliciting prostitution" law.8 0
The Durham law differs significantly from the other cities' ordinances.8 1
Essentially, if a person participates in any one of four activities for the
purpose of violating North Carolina drug laws, that person is guilty
of
82
activity.
drug-related
in
engaging
of
purpose
the
for
"loitering
76. See

GREENSBORO,

N.C.,

CODE

§ 18-46(b) (1989); HIGH POINT, N.C.,

CODE

§ 12-1-

9(b) (1989).
77. FAYETrEVILLE, N.C., CODE § 21-55(c)(4) (1989); see CHARLOTTE, N.C., CODE § 15-

31(b)(4) (1990).
78. FAYETrEVILLE, N.C.,

CODE

§ 21-55(c)(9) (1989); see

CHARLOTTE,

N.C., CODE

§§ 15-31(b)(8)-(b)(9) (1990).
79. See FAYETTEVILLE, N.C., CODE § 21-55(c)(9) (1989); see also
§ 15-31(c) (1990) (stating what constitutes probable cause).

CHARLOTTE,

N.C.,

CODE

80. See N.C. GEN STAT.

§

14-204.1 (1986).

Durham's ordinance reads:
(a) For the purpose of this section, "public place" means any street, sidewalk,
bridge, alley or alleyway, plaza, park, driveway, parking lot or transportation facility,
or the doorways and entranceway to any building which fronts on any of those places
or any motor vehicle in or on any of those places, or any property owned by the City
Durham.
(b) If a person remains or wanders about in a public place and
(1) Repeatedly beckons to, stops, or attempts to stop passers-by or repeatedly
attempts to engage passers-by in conversation; or
(2)

Repeatedly stops or attempts to stop motor vehicles; or

(3)

Repeatedly interferes with the free passage of other persons; or

(4) Repeatedly passes to or receives from passers-by, whether on foot or in a
vehicle, money or objects for the purpose of violating any subdivision of the North
Carolina General Substances Act, North Carolina General Statutes, Chapter 90, Article 5, that person is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be punished in the manner prescribed by North Carolina Gen. Stat. 14-4.
DURHAM, N.C., CODE § 12-62 (1990).
81. See DURHAM N.C. CODE § 12-62 (1990); cf CHARLOTTE, N.C.,
(b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(5) (1990) (listing prohibited activities).

CODE

§ 15-31(b)(1),

82. See DURHAM, N.C., CODE § 12-62 (1990). The four activities listed in the Durham
law are the same as those in § (b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3) and (b)(5) of the Charlotte ordinance. See
CHARLOTTE, N.C., CODE § 15-31 (1990).
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The Second and Third Generationsof LoiteringLaws

It is helpful to look at the reasons behind the emergence of "loitering with intent" laws and to examine the possibility for abuse. It is a
widely held view that the drug problem plaguing our nation has led to
rampant crime. Nevertheless, many have questioned whether this view
expresses the true motivation behind these laws. These critics argue that
the new loitering laws were passed only to harass minority communities.83 "Loitering with intent to engage in drug-related activity" laws are
targeted at high-crime areas, which are usually minority neighborhoods.

In many instances, however, it is the neighborhood
leaders who ask
84
zones."
"drug-free
areas
their
declare
lawmakers to
Others feel that lawmakers have enacted drug-loitering laws in re-

sponse to both public pressure and the difficulty police have in keeping
drug dealers off the streets under existing drug laws. Citizens and police

have lost faith in a system that requires probable cause before an arrest.
Probable cause "may be great in theory, but in practice it is worthless.
Drug dealers hang out for hours on the same block and cut their deals

with elaborate rituals designed to keep the drugs out of sight."85
Lawmakers pass drug-loitering laws to drive these drug dealers out of

neighborhoods. 86 Even if lawmakers enact drug loitering laws with good

83. Comparing the arrest rates for black and white Americans does provide some insight
into this issue. According to two studies, one by the FBI and the other by the National Institute for Drug Abuse, only 12% of the nation's drug users are African-Americans, but blacks
constitute up to 92% of those arrested for drug offenses. See Blacks and Drugs, CHARLOrTE
OBSERVER, July 13, 1992, at 8A. White Americans make up only 7% of those incarcerated
for drug offenses. Id.
84. Close to Home, WASH. POST, July 1, 1990, at B8. In Alexandria, Virginia, local citizens pushed for a drug-loitering law to control drug-related activity. Minority leaders claimed
"This is our ordinance. It was not foisted upon us.... [We asked the city to get rid of the
dealers on the corners .... It soon became obvious that a new law was needed, so we took the
issue to the police and later to the city council." Id. The drug loitering law the leaders sought
described as was a "hard won victory for our community." Id.
85. Id.; see supra note 62 and accompanying text.
86. Close to Home, supra note 84, at B8. The intention is to make neighborhoods as
uncomfortable as possible for the drug dealers in the hope that this will drive them away. Id.
Drug-loitering laws allow police to tell suspected drug dealers "to move on or risk arrest." Id.
A Minneapolis lawyer experienced first hand just how arbitrary a "loitering with intent"
law can be. He was sitting in a car talking to two clients, who were prostitutes, when they
were approached by police officers. The officers became angry when the attorney advised the
prostitutes not to answer the officers' questions. Incensed by the attorney's interference, the
officers searched the lawyer and charged him under the city's "loitering with intent to commit
prostitution" ordinance, remarking that "tihis is for you, mister smartass-criminal defense
lawyer. Maybe next time you'll let us reasonably question your client." Auston C. Wehrwein,
Lawyer Sues Over His Arrest, NAT'L LAW J., Dec. 2, 1985, at 9. The officers involved were
fired, but the police chief noted that "this is a classical case and this is a serious problem in law
enforcement of citizens failing the officers 'attitude test.'" Id. While the lawyer was fortunate
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intentions, good intentions often are not enough. Drug loitering laws
eject dealers from neighborhoods, but they do so in a street sweeping
fashion."
C. Ready to be Decided?
The North Carolina ordinances are by no means the only "loitering
with intent" laws in the United States; many cities and states have enacted similar laws.88 While courts around the country have considered
their validity,8 9 the Supreme Court has yet to address the issue. The
Court has, however, had the opportunity.
In New York v. Uplinger,90 the Court considered a constitutional
challenge to a statute forbidding "loitering 'in a public place for the purpose of engaging, or soliciting another person to engage, in deviate sexual
intercourse or other sexual behavior of a deviate nature.' "91 The highest
court in New York held that the statute violated the United States Constitution. 92 Although the Court acknowledged the importance of the issues presented in the case, a majority of the Justices agreed that the case
provided an "inappropriate vehicle for resolving the important constitutional issues raised by the parties." 93 The Court, after hearing oral arguments and reading the briefs, decided that the writ of certiorari had been
granted improvidently and let the New York decision stand.94
in that the charges were immediately dropped, similar police harassment of poor minorities
could easily go unnoticed.
87. The scenario of "charge with loitering, search, charge with drug offense, and (sometimes) drop loitering" exemplifies the street sweeping method of search first, charge later. See,
e.g., DrugArrests, UPI,Feb. 4, 1984, available in LExIs, Nexis Library, UPI File (stating that
"[t]he officers swooped down ...and arrested the nine men on various drug charges," including loitering and drug sale); Mitchell Freedman, Eleven Face Drug Counts, NEWSDAY, Nov.
28, 1988, at 30 (reporting that eleven people were charged with possession of controlled substance and loitering); Bill Van Haintze, Four Charged in Crack Deal, NEWSDAY, Apr. 23,
1988, at 16 (reporting that two people were charged with drug offenses, one substantive, one
loitering).
88. See McMahon, supra note 17, at 6.

89. See, e.g., Holliday v. City of Tampa, 586 So. 2d 64, 64-65 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)
(finding drug loitering law facially constitutional, but certifying the question to the Florida
Supreme Court to decide); Christian v. City of Kansas City, 710 S.W.2d 11, 14 (Mo. Ct. App.
1986) (finding prostitution loitering law unconstitutionally overbroad).
90. 467 U.S. 246 (1984).
91. Id. at 247 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35(3) (McKinney 1980)).
92. Id. (citing People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947
(1980)).
93. See id. at 249; see also id. at 251 (Stevens, J., concurring) (calling case an unwise
vehicle for deciding the "gravest and most delicate" issue of constitutionality).
94. Id. at 248. Justice Stevens, concurring, wrote that "[flundamental principles of constitutional adjudication counsel against premature consideration of constitutional questions
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The dissent, authored by Justice White and joined by then-Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor, indicated that four
question of the constitutionality of this
Justices were ready to answer the
95
"loitering with intent" statute.
D.

"'Loiteringwith Intent" Laws in Lower Courts

Although "loitering with intent" ordinances are popping up in
many of the nation's cities, 96 very few of these ordinances have faced
appellate review. The two cases that were appealed to federal courts of
appeals involved ordinances very similar to present-day loitering stat-

utes. 97 In the first of these cases, Sawyer v. Sandstrom,98 the challenged
ordinance made it illegal to "[11oiter[] in any place with one or more
persons knowing that a narcotic . . . is being unlawfully used or possessed." 9 9 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found the statute
unconstitutional on grounds of overbreadth.1 ° Finding that the statute's
01
scienter requirement provided adequate notice to potential offenders,
the court held that the statute could withstand a constitutional challenge
on vagueness grounds. 10 2 By making innocent acts the actus reus of a
crime, the loitering ordinance was overbroad regardless of its scienter
requirement. The court noted, however, that the intent element did
nothing to help "absolve [the statute] of the vice of overbreadth."' 3
Generally, in order to be valid, loitering laws "cannot sweep so
broadly as to infringe upon the constitutional and organic rights of the
individual."'" In determining the extent to which the statute infringed
upon the First Amendment right to associate freely, the court held that
the right to associate should be defined broadly to include more than
and demand that such questions be presented in a context conducive to the most searching
analysis possible." Id. at 251 (Stevens, J., concurring).
95. The full dissenting opinion reads as follows: "As I see it, the New York statute was
invalidated on federal constitutional grounds, and the merits of that decision are properly
before us and should be addressed. Dismissing this case as improvidently granted is not the
proper course." Id. at 252 (White, J., dissenting).
96. See, ag., CHARLOTTE, N.C., CODE § 15-31 (1990) (banning loitering for the purpose
of engaging in drug-related activity).
97. See Fields v. City of Omaha, 810 F.2d 830, 832 (8th Cir. 1987); Sawyer v. Sandstrom,
615 F.2d 311, 313 (5th Cir. 1980).
98. 615 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1980).
99. Id. at 313 (quoting METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY, FLA., CODE § 21-31.1(b)(2)
(1974)).

100. Id. at 318.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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political associations."'0 "'The rights of locomotion, freedom of movement, to go where one pleases, and to use the public streets in a way that
does not interfere with the personal liberty of others' are implicit in the
First and Fourteenth amendments."106 Because the First Amendment
protects these rights, the court held that such laws may be upheld only if
they prohibit "conduct which threatens the public safety or constitutes a
breach of the peace." 10 7 Under such an analysis, the court found the
loitering ordinance unconstitutional because it permitted arrest for constitutionally-protected conduct. 08 It also noted that "if the purpose of
the ordinance is to nip crime in the bud by providing police with the
means to arrest all suspicious persons, it is patently unconstitutional."'0 9

Reasoning that the state still had adequate remedies for drug-related
crime, the Sawyer court found that the "conduct which the state may
punish without running afoul of the First Amendment is more than adequately covered by [existing drug] provisions."' 10 Indeed, there is little
reason to have an ordinance making loitering for the purpose of using
drugs a crime when there are existing laws that make the sale of use of
drugs illegal.
In Fields v. City of Omaha,"' the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit considered a loitering ordinance that criminalized loitering "in a place, at a time or in a manner not usual for law abiding indi'
viduals."112
The Fields court struck down the ordinance, finding its
vagueness a violation of due process.' 13 Although the court did not
reach the plaintiff's contention that the ordinance also violated the
Fourth Amendment," 4 it hinted that the ordinance might violate this
constitutional provision as well. The court noted that, under the ordinance, the police were authorized to make an arrest without even enough
105. Id. at 316.
106. Id.
107. Id. The court noted that a breach of the peace occurs "'[w]hen clear and present
danger of riot, disorder, interference with traffic upon the public streets, or other immediate
threat to public safety'" occurs. Id. (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308
(1940)).
108. Id. at 317.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. 810 F.2d 830 (8th Cir. 1987). This case involved a civil suit in which a citizen, after
being jailed for nine days under the loitering law, sued the city on the grounds that her constitutional rights had been violated by her arrest and incarceration. Id. at 832.
112. Id. at 833 n.1 (quoting OMAHA, NEB., MUN. CODE § 20-171 (1967)). The language of
this ordinance implied that someone loitering "in a manner not usual for law abiding individuals" is actually loitering for an unlawful purpose.
113. Id. at 834.
114. Id. at 834 n.2.
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suspicion for a "Terry stop," 11 5 let alone an arrest for probable cause." 6
The court emphasized that "[w]alking in the middle of a street, even at
night, is not a crime, nor does it lead a reasonable person to conclude
that criminal behavior will soon occur." ' v
A greater number of cases at the district court level have tested the
constitutional validity of loitering laws. Waters v. McGuriman11 8 involved an ordinance nearly identical to the one in Fields."9 Unlike the
Fields court, the court in Waters overturned the law on both due process
and Fourth Amendment grounds. 12 0 The main problem, again, was the
ordinance's lack of a criminal act. The ordinance failed to "provide a
person of ordinary intelligence fair warning regarding which acts are prohibited and [it failed to] provide sufficiently clear standards for enforce-

ment of the Ordinance." '

l

The court found that the statute criminalized

innocent activities such as loafing or walking down a public street. "If
'loafing' were a criminal activity.., one could expect that all the good
citizens in th[e] community would at some time or other become defend'
The court held that the phrase "without
ants in a criminal action." 122
the constitutional defect. Even with the
to
cure
failed
business"
lawful
1 23
a potential "trap for innocent acts."
remained
ordinance
the
modifier,
The ordinance criminalized intent alone by "encourag[ing] arrests based
on suspicion or anticipation of future criminality, concepts which are foreign to our legal system." 1 24
According to the court, the ordinance also violated due process because it placed unfettered discretion in the hands of the police. 25 Under
the ordinance, "a policeman may not only stop and detain a person, but
can also arrest that person on less than reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity, based on articulable facts and circumstances." 1 26 Allowing arrests based on suspicion alone does not comport with the Fourth Amendment. 127 For a search and seizure to comply with the Fourth
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

See infra notes 341-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of "Terry stops."
Fields, 810 F.2d at 834 n.2.
Id. at 835.
656 F. Supp. 923 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
This ordinance forbids loitering "without lawful business." Id. at 925 (quoting BOR-

OUGH OF LANSDALE, PA., ORDINANCE 942, ch. 89, §§ 1-3 (1967)).

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 928-29.
Id. at 927.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 928.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 929.
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Amendment, there must be probable cause to believe the person will

commit a criminal act, not merely probable cause that a person is loitering with unlawful intent.
To date, all federal courts that have heard constitutional challenges

to modem "loitering with the intent to sell drugs" ordinances have
stricken them.128 Most recently, in 1990, a federal district court, in
Northern Virginia Chapter,American Civil Liberties Union v. City of Alexandria,1 29 invalidated a loitering for drug use law because of overbreadth. 3 ' The court's analysis focused on the ordinance's language

"delineat[ing] seven circumstances that unequivocally manifest an unlawful purpose." 131 The ordinance did not require that each of the seven

circumstances be done with unlawful intent; in effect, it criminalized the
seven activities, although all seven are innocent
ones encompassing a
32
wide variety of First Amendment activities.
The court in Alexandria noted that courts have upheld three types
33
of "loitering with intent" ordinances against overbreadth challenges.
Most of the ordinances found to withstand constitutional scrutiny make

loitering with an unlawful purpose illegal, and list factors that may be
128. See Northern Virginia Chapter, American Civil Liberties Union v. City of Alexandria,
747 F. Supp. 324, 329 (E.D. Va. 1990); Johnson v. Carson, 569 F. Supp. 974, 980 (M.D. Fla.
1983).
129. 747 F. Supp. 324 (E.D. Va. 1990).
130. Id. at 329. The ordinance provided:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person to loiter in a public place for the purpose of
engaging in the sale, gift, distribution, possession or purchase of a controlled substance .... Circumstances manifesting such purpose on the part of a person shall
include: (1) the person is in the same general location for at least 15 minutes;
(2) while in the same general location and in a public place, the person has two or

more face-to-face contacts with other individuals; and (3) each of such contacts (a) is
with one or more different individuals, (b) lasts no more than two minutes,
(c)involves actions or movements by the person consistent with an exchange of
money or other small objects, (d)involves actions or movements by the person consistent with an effort to conceal an object appearing to be or have been exchanged,
and (e)terminates shortly after the completion of the same apparent exchange. ...
(b) No person shall be arrested or convicted for a violation of this section unless
each of the circumstances identified in subsection (a) is present.
Id. at 325 (quoting ALEXANDRIA, VA., ORDINANCE 3471, § 13-1-24.1 (1990)).
131. Id. at 327.
132. Id. at 328. These activities include:
speaking in a public place for 15 minutes, shaking hands, and exchanging small objects such as business cards or phone numbers on small pieces of paper. Enforcement
of the ordinance may result in the conviction of individuals for distributing campaign literature, approaching persons to sign petitions, collecting organizational
dues, soliciting community support, and directing voters to polls.
Id.
133. Id. at 327.
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considered in finding the requisite intent.134 Others merely proscribe loi-

tering with an illegal purpose, without enumerating any factors that
demonstrate purpose.1 35 Finally, there are ordinances that make loitering for an unlawful purpose illegal and list factors that may manifest
intent only if each of the factors is done with an unlawful purpose. 136 No
court has upheld an ordinance that "delineates seven circumstances that
' 137
unequivocally manifest an unlawful purpose."
State courts have upheld some "loitering with intent" laws and invalidated others.1 38 In 1988, a Florida appellate court struck down a
loitering with intent to sell drugs ordinance based on vagueness, overbreadth, and the Fourth Amendment.1 39 Again, the main constitutional
deficiency with the statute was its lack of an actus reus; the ordinance
criminalized common conduct. The court remarked that the only loitering statute that can withstand constitutional scrutiny is one that "proscribes loitering that threatens public safety or a breach of the peace."" 4
V.

DOCTRINAL ATTACKS ON LOITERING LAWS

Litigants frequently challenge loitering laws on the constitutional
grounds that the ordinances attempt to criminalize the behavior of a suspected criminal before she actually commits an act in furtherance of a
crime. As the actor nears completion of the criminal act, it becomes
easier to define and prove the criminal conduct. Conversely, an incomplete or inchoate act is difficult to define and prove. When the actor is
merely thinking of and planning an act, for example, it is difficult to de134. Id. (citing Lambert v. City of Atlanta, 242 Ga. 645, 645, 250 S.E.2d 456, 457 (1978);
City of Cleveland v. Howard, 40 Ohio Misc. 2d 7, 7, 532 N.E.2d 1325, 1326 (1987); City of
Milwaukee v. Wilson, 96 Wis. 2d 11, 14-15, 291 N.W.2d 452, 455 (1980)).
135. Id. (citing People v. Smith, 44 N.Y.2d 613, 615, 378 N.E.2d 1032, 1035, 407 N.Y.S.2d
462, 465 (1978)).
136. Id. (citing Ford v. United States, 498 A.2d 1135, 1137 (D.C. 1985)).
137. Id.
138. Two of the most recent cases are: City of Akron v. Dixon, 62 Ohio lMfisc. 2d 218, 221,
594 N.E.2d 208, 210 (1992); City of Tacoma v. Luvene, 118 Wash. 2d 826, -, 827 P.2d 1374,
1383 (1992) (en banc); see also State v. Calloway, 589 So. 2d 326, 327 (Fla. App. 1991) (upholding lower court decision finding drug loitering law unconstitutional); People v. Goodwin,
136 Misc. 2d 657, 662-63, 519 N.Y.S.2d 189, 193 (1987) (finding drug loitering law constitutional); State v. Evans, 73 N.C. App. 214, 219, 326 S.E.2d 303, 306 (1985) (upholding prostitution loitering law as constitutional); City of Akron v. Holley, 53 Ohio Misc. 2d 4, 10, 557
N.E.2d 861, 886 (1990) (holding drug loitering law constitutional); Coleman v. City of Richmond, 5 Va. App. 459, 467, 364 S.E.2d 239, 244 (1988) (holding prostitution loitering law to
be unconstitutional); City of Seattle v. Slack, 113 Wash. 2d 850, 857, 784 P.2d 494, 496 (1989)
(upholding prostitution loitering law as constitutional).
139. City of Pompano Beach v. Wright, 28 Fla. Supp. 2d 114, 115-16 (1988).
140. Id.
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scribe accurately what constitutes a crime. 14 1 Loitering laws are troublesome in this respect because they criminalize only the intent to commit a
future crime:
Loitering, then, is a highly incipient crime, falling far short of
an attempt. It establishes the earliest boundary of criminality,
and one who approaches its line is not to be compared to the
criminal already in the act of kidnapping who is merely quibbling about the nature of ransom. The issue.., is the "drawing
of a line between legal conduct and illegal conduct."14' 2
This dilemma engenders constitutional challenges based on three
closely related arguments. First, loitering statutes may impermissibly
make constitutionally protected activity criminal, thereby invoking the
overbreadth doctrine.1 43 Second, loitering statutes inadequately define
exactly what conduct is prohibited. The vagueness doctrine voids these
criminal statutes on due process grounds since they fail to give defendants adequate notice. 1" Third, this vagueness also implicates Fourth
Amendment protections. 4 '
A review of the Supreme Court's treatment of these doctrines is
therefore necessary to analyze modem drug loitering laws. Where possible, this Comment discusses these doctrines in the context of their application to criminal statutes in general and, more specifically, to laws
regulating loitering. All three doctrines are subject to inconsistent and
often contradictory interpretations because, in many instances, the Court
does not spell out the doctrines clearly or indicate which doctrine applies
in a given case, but instead it frequently blurs the three doctrines into a
confusing, all encompassing "loitering doctrine.""' This larger "loitering doctrine" provides a more analytically coherent means to examine
loitering laws. 4 7 Initially, however, one must examine the individual
doctrines of overbreadth and vagueness, as well as the principles underlying the Fourth Amendment, to understand how they interrelate in' the
context of loitering laws.
141. Without an overt criminal act or omission in connection with an unlawful intent, a
law attempts to make mere thoughts criminal. By associating lawful acts with an unlawful
intent, a law can circumvent the requirement of a criminal act.
142. McSherry v. Block, 880 F.2d 1049, 1060 (9th Cir. 1989) (Candy, J., dissenting).
143. See infra notes 148-243 and accompanying text.
144. See infra notes 244-316 and accompanying text.
145. See infra notes 316-408 and accompanying text.
146. See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 171 (1972) (alluding to
overbreadth, vagueness, and probable cause, but concentrating its analysis generally on why
loitering is constitutionally protected).
147. The three arguments relate to each other because they all are triggered by loitering
laws' lack of criminal intent.
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The Overbreadth Doctrine

Every legitimate criminal statute targets some core criminal conduct
encompassing activities that lawmakers may proscribe, including instances of unprotected speech and association. 148 The core criminal conduct-the criminal act or actus reus-defines the statute's permissible
scope. The Constitution, however, limits the scope of conduct that may

be proscribed.14 9 This limitation leads to a difficult question: Can an

individual whose conduct is legitimately proscribed by a statute challenge that statute on constitutional grounds because it also impermissibly
proscribes some other, protected conduct?
The general rule of standing for constitutional adjudication is that a

person may challenge a statute only if it is unconstitutional as applied to
him. "' Thus, a statute cannot be challenged based on how the government might apply it to other people."' The rationale supporting this
rule is that constitutional rights belong to the individual, and it is up to
the individual to assert them. 152 An exception to the rule arises when

someone not party to a lawsuit is nevertheless affected by it,'53 and who
otherwise would never have the opportunity to air her constitutional
claims and to preserve her rights.' 5 4
This exception is necessary to protect certain forms of expression
under the First Amendment.1 55 Courts always have given special consti148. Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 459-63 (1987). See generally Note, The FirstAmendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. Rv. 844, 853-56 (1970) (emphasizing that overbroad statutes have the undesirable effect of deterring certain lawful conduct as well as
punishing people who engage in such conduct).
149. Note, supra note 148, at 853-56. In Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), the
Supreme Court commented on the impermissible scope of some criminal statutes:
[A threat like censorship] is inherent in a penal statute, like that in cluestion here,
which does not aim specifically at evils within the allowable area of state control but,
on the contrary, sweeps within its ambit other activities that in ordinary circumstances constitute an exercise of freedom of speech or of the press.
Id. at 97.
150. See, e.g., United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960); Yazoo & Miss. V. R.R. v.
Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217, 219-20 (1912); Supervisors v. Stanley, 105 U.S. 305, 311-15
(1881).
151. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610 (1973) (finding that statute could not be
challenged "on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, in
other situations not before the Court").
152. Id.
153. Id. at 611.
154. Id.; see, ag., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 444-46 (1972); NAACP v. Alabama,
357 U.S. 449, 458-60 (1958).
155. For cases involving associational rights, see United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 26268 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-10 (1967); Aptheker v. Secretary
of State, 378 U.S. 500, 509-12 (1964). For cases involving spoken words, see Gooding v. Wil-
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tutional scrutiny to statutes possibly infringing upon the First Amendment 156 because such rights need "breathing space": 5 7 "These freedoms
are delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society.
The threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the
actual application of sanctions." 15' 8 Therefore, a statute, even if it has
valid aims, 59 may regulate First Amendment rights only within a nar1 60
row range.

When a legislature enacts laws affecting constitutionally protected
conduct, an individual will tend to avoid that conduct instead of risking

punishment by asserting his rights.16 1 It is not, however, in society's collective best interest to encourage individuals to decline to exercise their
First Amendment rights in an effort to avoid possible punishment.' 6 2
The overbreadth doctrine emerged from this concern and represents an
exception to standing.

This narrow range of First Amendment rights that can be regulated
is at the core of overbreadth doctrine, but overbreadth is often misunderstood.1 63 The theory protects constitutional rights by "focus[ing] directly on the need for precision in legislative draftsmanship to avoid

conflict with First Amendment rights."164 By transforming the standing
rules to allow litigants to assert third party rights,

65

the overbreadth

doctrine increases the probability of constitutional challenge. Once challenged in court, a law proven to be overbroad is declared invalid in its
son, 405 U.S. 518, 520 (1972); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 18 (1971); Street v. New York,
394 U.S. 576, 590-94 (1969); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
156. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-12 (1973); Grayned v. City of Rockford,
408 U.S. 104, 116-17 (1972); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960); Herndon v. Lowry,
301 U.S. 242, 258 (1937).
157. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
158. Id.
159. Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 459 (1987); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358-59
n.8 (1983); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 106 (1940).
160. Button, 371 U.S. at 433 (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 (1940)).
161. This phenomenon is called the "chilling effect." See generally Frederick Schauer,
Fear,Risk, and the FirstAmendment: Unraveling the "Chilling Effect," 58 B.U. L. REv. 685
(1978) (analyzing and applying the "chilling effect" doctrine).
162. The Court has emphasized the importance, to all of society, of free exercise of First
Amendment rights: "Because of the sensitive nature of constitutionally protected expression,
we have not required that all of those subject to overbroad regulations risk prosecution to test
their rights. For free expression-of transcendent value to all society, and not merely to those
exercising their rights-might be the loser." Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
163. This is partially because of the confusion with vagueness, see infra notes 308-11 and
accompanying text, and is also because courts do not understand the constitutional basis for
the overbreadth doctrine. See infra notes 167-77 and accompanying text.
164. Hobbs v. Thompson, 448 F.2d 456, 459-60 (5th Cir. 1971).
165. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 112 n.8 (1990).
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entirety. 166
The constitutional basis for the overbreadth doctrine has never been
fully explained by courts. 1 6 7 The overbreadth doctrine is derived from
both personal rights-based theory and prophylactic theory. 168 The personal rights theory derives directly from the Constitution. 69 It asserts

that everyone has a right "to be judged in accordance with a constitutionally valid rule of law."' 10 If the law restricts constitutionally pro-

tected activity, a court must invalidate the whole law, unless the
unconstitutional aspect of the statute is severable from the whole

statute.171
The prophylactic theory provides safeguards that supplement the
protections of the constitutionally mandated rights-based theory. 172 The
prophylactic theory is essentially a procedural departure from the rules
of standing. 173 Although facial challenges based on the assertion of
third party rights generally are disfavored, courts are more open to such
challenges when First Amendment rights are involved.' 7 4 The judicially
created prophylactic theory is designed to protect First Amendment activity by eliminating the chilling effect of overbroad statutes on constitutionally protected expression. 175 Thus, the prophylactic theory does not
involve any personal constitutional rights 1 76 because the only rights as17 7
serted are those of third parties who are not present in court.
Loitering laws and overbreadth claims have been bedfellows since
the first enumerations of the overbreadth doctrine more than fifty years
ago.178 In the first overbreadth cases, the Court addressed statutes used
166. Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 577 (1987).
167. Richard H. Fallon Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 875 (1991).
168. Id. at 867-75.
169. Id. at 871.
170. Henry P. Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 Sup. Cr. Rnv. 1, 3; see also Fallon, supra
note 167, at 875 (employing a rationale similar to that noted for the constitutional basis of the
vagueness doctrine).
171. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 506 (1985).
172. Fallon, supra note 167, at 870.
173. Id. at 867. Professor Fallon, when he uses the term "prophylactic," means to suggest
two things: first, the central constitutional concern is to protect the expressive rights of persons other than the specific individual involved in the litigation, and second, this aspect of the
overbreadth doctrine is judge-made law, so the Supreme Court retains discretion to change the
doctrine depending on its perception of the doctrine's effects. Id. at 868 n.94.
174. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 112 n.8 (1990).
175. Fallon, supra note 167, at 868.
176. See Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 958 (1984).
177. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 444-46 (1972).
178. In Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), the Supreme Court heard a constitutional challenge to a loitering statute. Id. at 91. The Court changed First Amendment overbreadth analysis from traditional case-by-case "as applied" challenges to "facial" attacks on
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to quiet discussion of views outside the mainstream.' 79 Lawmakers
could effectively quash unpopular groups' activities through the use of
these laws. 180 Because the statutes usually regulated only spoken

words,'I' the Court compared overbroad laws to censorship.' 8 2 With the
passage of time, however, overbreadth analysis encompassed all First
Amendment freedoms. 8 3
The overbreadth doctrine applies to statutes that encompass First

Amendment activities.' 84 The First Amendment rights frequently
abridged in loitering statutes include the freedoms of assembly' and
association.1 8 6 A person has a right to associate with other individuals or

organizations for the purpose of engaging in activities protected by the
statutes "which [do] not aim specifically at evils within the allowable area of state control but,
on the contrary, [sweep] within [their] ambit other activities that in ordinary circumstances
constitute an exercise of freedom of speech or of the press." Id. at 97. Many scholars point to
Thornhill as the first case that used the modem overbreadth theory. See, e.g., Fallon, supra
note 167, at 853 (noting that the overbreadth doctrine had its inception in Thornhilo;
Monaghan, supra note 170, at 11 (asserting that Thornhill was the "fountainhead of the overbreadth doctrine"); Martin H. Redish, The Warren Court, the Burger Court and the First
Amendment OverbreadthDoctrine,78 Nw. U. L. tEv. 1031, 1038-39 (1983) (noting that facial
challenges to overbroad statutes date back to Thornhill).
179. See Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 97-98.
180. These statutes provide authorities an avenue to employ harsh and discriminatory enforcement against people whom they do not like. Id.
181. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520 (1972); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16
(1971); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 577-78 (1969).
182. As the Court explained in Thornhill:
It is not merely the sporadic abuse of power by the censor but the pervasive threat
inherent in its very existence that constitutes the danger to freedom of discussion....
A like threat is inherent in a penal statute.., which does not aim specifically at evils
within the allowable area of state control but.., sweeps within its ambit other activities ....
Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 97.
183. The Court has applied the overbreadth doctrine in a variety of cases, including those
involving rights of association, see United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 261 (1967), Keyishian
v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-10 (1967), Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500,
514 (1964), those regulating time, place, and manner of expressive conduct, see Grayned v.
City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114-21 (1972), Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 249-50
(1967), and those giving local officials standardless discretionary power to regulate First
Amendment rights. See Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969); Cox v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 556-58 (1965).
184. The overbreadth analysis is particularly applicable to loitering statutes because such
laws usually are written to facilitate the arrest of people whose conduct is on the borderline
between the innocent and the criminal. See supra notes 133-40 and accompanying text.
185. See, e.g., Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971) (declaring loitering
statute unconstitutional because "it subjects the exercise of the right of assembly to an unascertainable standard").
186. See, eg., Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S.
489, 499 (1982) (requiring a more stringent vagueness test for cases interfering with the right
of free speech or association).
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First Amendment.1 7 Freedom of association incorporates freedom of
assembly and other constitutionally protected liberties."' 8 The freedom
of association recognized by the Supreme Court protects two overlapping
rights: the "freedom of intimate association" and the "freedom of expressive association." ' 9 In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 9 ' the Court
explained the interplay between these two distinct aspects of the freedom

of association:
[C]hoices to enter into and maintain certain intimate human
relationships must be secured against undue intrusion by the

State because of the role of such relationships in safeguarding
the individual freedom that is central to our constitutional

scheme. In this respect, freedom of association receives protection as a fundamental element of personal liberty ....[There
is] a right to associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment-speech [and] assembly . . . . The Constitution guarantees freedom of

association of this kind as an indispensable means of preserving
other individual liberties.
The intrinsic and instrumental features of constitutionally
protected association may... coincide. 9 '

Freedom of association protects the rights of citizens to engage in a

variety of interpersonal relationships' 92 and in basic social intercourse.193
Loitering laws, in the name of crime prevention, limit these associational

187. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 662 (1984); see Coates, 402 U.S. at
615-16 (holding that defendants have the constitutional right to assemble on public sidewalk
with three others and annoy people); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968) (recognizing
the right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (holding freedom of association violated when right to
marital privacy denied by statute outlawing contraceptives); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
428-29 (1963) (holding that a law forbidding NAACP from soliciting clients violated freedom
of association); Shelton v. Tucker 364 U.S. 479, 490 (1960) (declaring that schools cannot
force teachers to reveal all associations).
188. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617-18.
189. Id. at 618.
190. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
191. Id. at 617-18.
192. The Court sought to preserve the diversity of culture and traditions in the United
States through protecting personal relationships. See id. at 618-19 ("[P]ersonal bonds have
played a critical role in the culture and traditions of the Nation by cultivating and transmitting
shared ideals and beliefs; they thereby foster diversity and act as critical buffers between the
individual and the power of the State.").
193. Id. at 619-20. Freedom of association is not restricted to expression of political, religious, or social beliefs. Id. This broad freedom protects not just "strident, contentious or
divisive" expression but also "quiet persuasion, inculcation of traditional values, instruction of
the young, and community service." Id. at 636 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgement).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

rights by criminalizing their exercise.' 94
Loitering laws usually target associational activity that occurs on
the streets or in other public places. 195 These laws should be scrutinized

carefully because the streets and public places have always been protected locations for First Amendment activity. 196 The state cannot deny

citizens the free exercise of their First Amendment freedoms in public
streets and parks under the guise of regulation.1 97 As the Court stated in
Hague v. C.I.O.:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public ... for
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets
and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the
privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.' 9 8
The only way the government may regulate First Amendment activity in a public forum is if the regulation complies with the time, place,
and manner test.' 99 Under this test, if a statute is content-neutral, "narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave[s]
open ample alternative channels of communication," it then may regulate the conduct, but only by affecting the time, place, and manner of
expression. 2°° The nature of the place is central to this analysis, as is the
associational conduct; these factors determine what is a reasonable restriction on the time, place, and manner of expression. 20 ,
A statute, however, cannot criminalize ordinary associational con-

duct that is not a breach of the peace.20 2 Statutes that affect First
194. See, e.g., Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 616 (1971) (An ordinance that

disallowed the gathering of three or more people on the sidewalk "ma[de] a crime out of what
under the Constitution cannot be a crime. It [was] aimed directly at activity protected by the
Constitution.").

195. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Sandstrom, 615 F.2d 311, 313 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding unconstitutional a statute forbidding loitering with persons known to use or possess narcotics).

196. See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 105-06 (1940) ("[The] streets are natural
and proper places for the dissemination of information and opinion; and one is not to have the
exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be
exercised in some other place.") (quoting Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939)).
197. Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939).
198. Id.
199. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481-82 (1988).
200. Perry Educ. Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n., 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
201. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972) ("The crucial question is
whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time."); see, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 15556 (1969) (finding that city cannot allow two parades to march simultaneously on the same
place).
202. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170 (1972); Chaplinsky v. New
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Amendment rights in public places are subject to heightened overbreadth
scrutiny.2 °3 The standard of scrutiny is even higher if the statute imposes
criminal penalties, as do loitering ordinances. 2"
The Supreme Court's present approach to the overbreadth doctrine
is very basic. For the overbreadth doctrine to apply, the statute must
criminalize constitutionally protected activity,20° and the alleged overbreadth must be real20 6 and substantial in relation to the statute's
"plainly legitimate sweep." 20 7 After these requirements are met, a litigant may challenge all possible applications of the statute.20 8 Once a
court finds that a statute is overbroad, it must examine lower state court
attempts to limit the overbreadth.20 9 If the state court limiting constructions fail to cure the overbreadth, then the court (a higher state court or a

federal court) must try to find a limiting construction that would solve
the constitutional problem.2 10 Only after all attempts to eliminate the
overbreadth concerns have failed can a court invalidate the entire

statute.211
The first question to consider when examining a potentially overHampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573-74 (1942). In evaluating the associational overbreadth of a
loitering statute, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that "[a loitering law] can be
upheld only if it proscribes conduct which threatens the public safety or constitutes a breach of
the peace." Sawyer v. Sandstrom, 615 F.2d 311, 316 (5th Cir. 1980). The Supreme Court has
offered insight into the type of breach of peace necessary: The "power of the state to prevent
or punish" arises "[w]hen clear and present danger of riot, disorder, interference with traffic
upon the public streets, or other immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order, appears
." Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940).
203. See Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 572-75 (1987) (discussing
public fora analysis and declaring statute forbidding First Amendment activities in airports
overbroad); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614-16 (1971) (declaring statute proscribing three or more people loitering on a sidewalk overbroad).
204. Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451,459 (1987); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 359 n.8
(1983); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948).
205. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 n.8.
206. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973); see City Council of Los Angeles v.
Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 801 (1984) ("[T]here must be a realistic danger that the
statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties
not before the Court for it to be facially challenged on overbreadth grounds.").
207. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615; see Jewsfor Jesus, 482 U.S. at 574; Hill, 482 U.S. at 45859; Taxpayersfor Vincent, 466 U.S. at 801; New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769 (1982).
208. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615; see also Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491,
503 (1985) (The statute may be challenged because it "threatens others not before the Courtthose who desire to engage in legally protected expression but who may refrain from doing so
rather than risk prosecution or undertake to have the law declared partially invalid.").
209. Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494
n.5 (1982); Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613.
210. Jews For Jesus, 482 U.S. at 574-77; Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613.
211. Jews For Jesus, 482 U.S. at 577; Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613; Dombrowski v. Pfister,

380 U.S. 479, 491 (1965).
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broad statute is: does the statute attempt to regulate conduct or "pure
speech?" If pure speech is sanctioned, the next step is to determine if the
overbreadth is real.2 12 The Court has never explicitly articulated the definition of 'real,' but it did provide some insight in Houston v. Hill.2 13
Quoting from Justice Brennan's dissent in Broadrickv. Oklahoma,2 14 the
Court proclaimed, "We have never held that a statute should be held
invalid on its face merely because it is possible to conceive of a single
impermissible application ....
Justice Brennan had argued in his
Broadrick dissent that there was always, implicit in the overbreadth doctrine, some threshold point beyond which its application would be
absurd.2 16
The Broadrick majority held that where a statute sanctions conduct
rather than "pure speech," the challenger must demonstrate "substantial
overbreadth" to continue the overbreadth analysis. 2 17 The Broadrick

Court attempted to incorporate a balancing test to determine standing
for an overbreadth attack. 21 8 Broadrick envisioned two poles-"pure
speech" and criminal behavior-and put constitutionally protected conduct somewhere in the middle. As the statute shifts from criminalizing
"pure speech" to criminalizing expressive conduct, a greater degree of
overbreadth is required to satisfy the "substantial overbreadth" requirement. 2 19 A law may criminalize expressive conduct if it "falls within the
scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. ' 22° The degree of constitutionally protected
conduct a statute may criminalize depends on the size of overbreadth in
relation to how great the "statute's plainly legitimate sweep" is. 22 1 The
Court called for a case-by-case analysis of whether substantial overbreadth is present.22 2
Justice Brennan disagreed with the Broadrick Court's use of the
212. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615.
213. 482 U.S. 451, 458 (1987).
214. 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
215. Hill, 482 U.S. at 458 (quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 630 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
216. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 630-31 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
217. Id. at 615.
218. Id. at 612-15.
219. Id. at 615.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 615-16. Justice Brennan noted that there was no reason, for purposes of the
overbreadth analysis, why "deterrence of conduct should be viewed differently from deterrence
of speech, even where both are equally protected by the First Amendment." Id. at 631 (Bren-

nan, J., dissenting).

1993]

LOITERING LAWS

term "substantial overbreadth."2' 2 Justice Brennan questioned how
much more stringent, if any, the new standard would be compared to the
"real" standard.2 2 4 Hindsight suggests that, in the case of loitering laws,
the "substantial overbreadth" requirement may have only been a cosmetic change because recent Supreme Court decisions merely mention
the requirement before deciding if the statutes are overbroad on other
grounds.22 5
Once a court finds a statute either "substantially overbroad," in the
case of conduct, or "real," for pure speech, those challenging it have
standing to attack the statute "on its face." '226 A litigant may argue that
the statute's very existence will cause others to stop exercising their First
Amendment rights. 227 This enables litigants to avoid questions regarding
their own conduct, even if criminal, and emphasizes the effect that the
statute could have on others.22 8 Once a statute is vulnerable to a facial
overbreadth attack in the instant case, it is, by its definition, ripe for attack by every person who is arrested pursuant to it.229 If the court finds
a statute facially overbroad in one instance, then the law is invalid in
every application. 230 A statute that has many legitimate applications still
may be facially invalid as long as it criminalizes a substantial amount of
constitutionally protected conduct.2 3 1
For these reasons, the Broadrick Court referred to the application of
the overbreadth doctrine as "strong medicine. It has been employed by
the Court sparingly and only as a last resort ' 232 after the Court has attempted to find a limiting construction 233 in a lower court interpreta235
tion 234 or on its own.
223. Id. at 630-31 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
224. Id. at 630 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("Whether the Court means to require some different or greater showing of substantiality is left obscure by today's opinion ....
").
225. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 359 n.8, 361 (1983) (discussing the "substantial overbreadth" requirement, but deciding case on First Amendment vagueness grounds); see
also Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494
(1982) (following a statement of the "substantial overbreadth" requirement, the Court decided
that overbreadth does not apply to commercial speech).
226. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 610-14.
227. Id. at 612.
228. Id. at 611-13.
229. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965); see Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 629
(Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
230. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 474 (1974).
231. Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 459 (1987); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 359 n.8

(1983).
232. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613.
233. Id. "
234. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520 (1972); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479,
491 (1965).
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The Court has provided some guidance to lower courts in arriving at

a limiting construction. When a state court hears a constitutional challenge to a law before it reaches a federal court, the state court must attempt to sever all overbroad portions of the law. 236 If this severance does

not remedy the overbreadth, the state court must construe the law to
bring it within constitutional standards.

23 7

Courts have assumed that a

narrowing construction that severs overbroad portions of the statute will
effectively cure the statute.23
The resulting statute must be narrowly tailored. 2 39 This does not

necessarily mean that just because the statute has clear lines of innocence
and guilt, it will survive an overbreadth challenge; 240 even a clear and
precise statute may be overbroad if constitutionally protected conduct is
still proscribed with criminal conduct.2 4 1 The statute may stand only if

there are no alternate ways to achieve the desired result without less infringement on First Amendment activity.24 2 A lawmaking body cannot

use subterfuge to foreclose constitutional rights, and it cannot criminalize
'
constitutionally protected behavior through the use of "mere labels."243
235. Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 575 (1987); see, e.g., Erznoznik
v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216 (1975); Dombrowski, 380 U.S. at 497. If courts
cannot find an adequate limiting construction, they must declare the statute invalid. Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 584 (1989); Broadrick,413 U.S. at 613 ("Facial overbreadth
has not been invoked when a limiting construction has been or could be placed on the challenged statute.").
236. See Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. at 575 (finding statute that regulated "all First Amendment activities" to be unsalvageable).
237. See Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1969) ("It is true that in
affirming the petitioner's conviction in the present case, the Supreme Court of Alabama performed a remarkable job of plastic surgery upon the face of the ordinance."); see also Kolender
v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 355 (1983) (" '[A] federal court must . . . consider any limiting
construction that a state court or enforcement agency has proffered.' ") (quoting Village of
Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 n.5 (1982)).
238. See, eg., Osborne v. Ohio, 496 U.S. 103, 116 n.12 (1990) ("[Ojnce a statute is authoritatively construed, there is no longer any danger that protected speech will be deterred .... ").
239. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 562-64 (1965); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
307 (1940).
240. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 249-50 (1967).
241. Id.
242. Statutes that cover expressive First Amendment conduct are subject to the "least
drastic means test":
[E]ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose
cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when
the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgement must
be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (footnotes omitted).
243. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963).
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The Vagueness Doctrine

The vagueness doctrine, at least in part, is closely related to the
overbreadth doctrine. A separate, more stringent, vagueness standard
has emerged for statutes affecting constitutionally protected rights. This
section first examines the traditional vagueness doctrine and its applica-

tions to the "average" statute. Next, this section details the "right to
loiter" and then discusses the more stringent standard for vagueness ap-

plied to loitering laws.
1. The General Vagueness Doctrine
The vagueness doctrine emerged in response to the belief that both

citizens and police should have specific guidelines as to what constitutes
unlawful activity under a statute.'

4

The doctrine is rooted in the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.245 A statute is unconsti-

tutionally vague if it proscribes "the doing of an act in terms so vague
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application." '4 6 More specifically, the vagueness doc-

trine voices two related concerns: that citizens receive fair notice of what
a statute prohibits and that they be protected against arbitrary enforcement of the statute. 247

First, to avoid vagueness problems, a statute must provide citizens
244. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566,
572-73 (1974); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972); Papachristou v. City
of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972); Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391
(1926).
245. See, e.g., Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 612-14 (1971). Vague statutes
that permit arbitrary enforcement violate due process. See Village of Hoffman Estates v. The
Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497 (1982); Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09; Cox v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 552 (1965); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 96-98 (1940);
Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 259 (1937); see also Lanzetta v. New Jersey 306 U.S. 451,
453 (1939) ("[T]he terms [the statute] employs to indicate what it purports to denounce are so
vague, indefinite and uncertain that it must be condemned as repugnant to the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
246. Connally, 269 U.S. at 391; see also Lanzetta, 306 U.S. at 453 (quoting Connally, 269
U.S. at 391).
247. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357; Hoffman Estates,455 U.S. at 498; Goguen, 415 U.S. at 57273; Papachristou,405 U.S. at 162; Connally, 269 U.S. at 391. The Court explained the two
"values" underlying the vagueness doctrine in Grayned:
First, because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give... [citizens] a reasonable opportunity to know what is
prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not
providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be
prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them.
Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09. .
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with clear notice of what activity constitutes the offense.248 It must "give
the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know
what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. ' 249 Most loitering
laws still employ vague language in defining the criminal act, thereby
causing notice problems.2 50 The Supreme Court held in Lanzetta v. New
Jersey251 that a criminal statute which "condemns no act or omission"
does not give notice and "is condemned as repugnant to the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. ' 2 2 Without an actus reus, or
equivalently, when a statute "makes criminal activities which by modem
standards are normally innocent, ' 253 there is no notice providing standard of conduct." 4
Adding a scienter requirement to a statute may facilitate notice,2"'
but it does not automatically solve the problem.256 One reason a scienter
248. Connally, 269 U.S. at 391 ("[A] new offense must be sufficiently explicit to inform
those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties, is
a well-recognized requirement, consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules of law."); see Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357; Grayned,408 U.S. at 108; Papachristou,405
U.S. at 162; Lanzetta, 306 U.S. at 453.
249. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108 (observing that a vague statute "may trap the innocent by
not providing fair warning" of the forbidden activity and the accompanying penalty); see, e.g.,
United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954) (holding that a statute is void if it "fails to
give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by
the statute"); Lanzetta, 306 U.S. at 453 ("No one may be required at peril of life, liberty or
property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to
what the State commands or forbids.").
250. See supra notes 244-46 and accompanying text.
Loitering laws serve as good examples of statutes that do not specify a criminal act. These
laws have problems defining a determinable actus reus. See Papachristou,405 U.S. at 168-69
(noting the traditional lack of a criminal act in loitering laws); cf Edelman v. California, 344
U.S. 357, 364-66 (1954) (Black, J., dissenting) (noting that vagrancy is a crime of status) (citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962)). By using the term "loitering," loitering laws
turn innocent activity into criminal conduct. Papachristou,405 U.S. at 163. It follows that a
citizen could never know when a police officer would deem his particular "hanging around" as
criminal loitering. Id. at 163-66. Even if the loitering law were aimed at a criminal purpose, it
would still contain no criminal act: an arrest for loitering with intent is an arrest for suspicion
of a future criminal act. Id. at 169. While this type of arrest would be condoned in a police
state, the Supreme Court has rightly noted that such arrests are "foreign to our system." Id. at
168 n.12, 169 (noting that in Czarist Russia a particular code permitted a judge to convict a
person "even when he had committed not act defined as a crime.") (citations omitted).
251. 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
252. Id. at 458.
253. Papachristou,405 U.S. at 163.
254. See, eg., Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971) (finding that where "no standard of conduct is specified at all[,]... 'men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at
its meaning' ") (citing Connally, 269 U.S. at 391).
255. The Supreme Court "has long recognized that the constitutionality of a vague statutory standard is closely related to whether that standard incorporates a requirement of mens
rea." Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395 (1979) (citations omitted).
256. See Papachristou,405 U.S. at 163-64; see also Colautti,439 U.S. at 395 n.13 (" 'The
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requirement may fail is that "[t]he poor... [or] the average householder
...[is not] protected from being caught in the vagrancy net by the necessity of having a specific intent to commit an unlawful act."2' 57 Also, a
statute that contains a scienter requirement may still provide inadequate
notice if the mens rea is defined in such a way that it encompasses seemingly innocent activity.2" 8 Finally, a scienter requirement can merely
help a vague statute solve notice problems;2 5 9 the potential for arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement is not affected by the addition of an in-

tent requirement.
In addition to providing notice to the public, a clear and precise

statute provides notice to law enforcement agencies, and thereby protects
citizens against arbitrary enforcement. Conversely, a vague statute "impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and ju-

ries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with attendant
dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application."2 6 The Supreme
Court noted that the second part of the vagueness doctrine, which establishes minimum standards to govern law enforcement, is the more impor-

tant prong.261 Without minimum guidelines, lawmakers give police and
prosecutors the equivalent of a general warrant.2 62 Under a vague law,
requirement that the act must be willful or purposeful may not render certain, for all purposes,

a statutory definition of the crime which is in some respects uncertain.' ") (quoting Screws v.
United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101-02 (1945) (plurality opinion)).
257. Papachristou,405 U.S. at 162-63.
258. See, e.g., id. at 164 ("The qualification 'without any lawful purpose or object' maybe a
trap for innocent acts.").
259. Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 49899 (1982) ("[A] scienter requirement may mitigate a law's vagueness, especially with respect to
the adequacy of notice to the complainant that his conduct is proscribed."). The Court has
recognized this fact since 1945:
The requirement of a specific intent to do a prohibited act may avoid those consequences to the accused which may otherwise render a vague or indefinite statute
invalid.... [It does not solve all vagueness problems], [b]ut it does relieve the statute
of the objection that it punishes without warning an offense of which the accused was
unaware.
Screws, at 101-02 (plurality opinion) (quoted in Colautti,439 U.S. at 395 n.13).
260. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972); see Papachristou,405 U.S.
at 168; see also Colautti,439 U.S. at 390 (noting that vague statutes encourage "arbitrary and
erratic arrests and convictions").
261. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983) ("[T]he more important aspect of the
vagueness doctrine 'is not actual notice, but the other principal element of the doctrine-the
requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.' ")
(quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974)).
262. Id.; see also Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 135 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in the result) (A vague law "confers on police a virtually unrestrained power to arrest
and charge persons with a violation."). The Supreme Court recognized this danger as early as
1876:
It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set a net large enough to
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police are free to make a "standardless sweep" to arrest those whom they
subjectively believe deserve arrest, usually the poor and minorities.263
The only way to safeguard all citizens from this treatment is to require
penal statutes to include explicit guidelines for law enforcement.'"

Lawmakers should avoid loitering statutes because they lack explicit language and actually facilitate harsh, arbitrary enforcement. 265 These statutes often use "future criminality ' 26 6 to justify the criminalization of

innocent activity. Loitering laws are "in a class by themselves, in view of
267

the familiar abuses to which they are put.
Loitering laws often function as dragnet laws. 268 Dragnet laws are
designed as misdemeanors that carry only light penalties and thereby
avoid appellate review, which gives police virtually unlimited discretion
to make arrests. 269 The "net cast is so large, not to give the courts the

power to pick and choose but to increase the arsenal of police. ' 270 When
legislatures draft loitering laws that function as dragnet laws 27
they
not
1
only condone arbitrary enforcement, but actually encourage it.

catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside and say who
could rightly be detained, and who should be set at large. This would, to some extent, substitute the judicial for the legislative department of the government.
United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1875).
263. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358. The victims of such arbitrary and discriminatory arrests
are usually those who need protection the most: poor minorities. Papachristou,405 U.S. at
163-64; see THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK
FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 184 (1967), quoted in part in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14 n. 11
(1967); see also MICHAEL K. BROWN, WORKING THE STREETS: POLICE DISCRETION AND

THE DILEMMAS OF REFORM 163-69 (1981) ("Race, the field observations reveal, is one of the

most salient criteria to patrolmen in deciding whether or not to stop someone."). These are
the "particular groups deemed to merit [the police's] displeasure," and they receive "harsh and
discriminatory enforcement [of vague laws] by local prosecuting officials." Papachristou,405
U.S. at 170. Under such enforcement, the poor and unpopular walk on the streets subject to
"the whim of any police officer." Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90 (1965). It is a
tragedy and a serious blow to this country's diversity that "poor people [and] non-conformists
...may be required to comport themselves according to the lifestyle deemed appropriate to
the... police." Papachristou,405 U.S. at 170.
264. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108.
265. Papachristou,405 U.S. at 169-70.
266. Id. at 169.
267. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 540 (1948) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
268. Papachristou,405 U.S at 166-67 ("Where the list of crimes is so all-inclusive and
generalized ... those convicted may be punished for no more than vindicating affronts to
police authority.").
269. Id. at 165-68.
270. Id. at 165.
271. If police believe someone is guilty but they cannot prove it, or if they believe that
person is soon to be guilty, then they may charge him with loitering with little or no evidence.
The Common ground which brings such a motley assortment of human troubles
before the magistrates in vagrancy-type proceedings is the procedural laxity which
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Lawmakers, however, may diminish the possibility of arbitrary enforcement of a vague statute by using regulations as a tool for narrowing
the scope of the law.272 In Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside,
Hoffman Estates, Inc.,2 73 the Supreme Court refused to hold a statute
void for vagueness on a pre-enforcement challenge.27 4 The Court let the
law stand because the lawmakers had not yet been given the opportunity
to adopt regulations that would "sufficiently narrow potentially vague or
arbitrary interpretations of the ordinance. '27 5 The Court admitted that
there was a risk of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, but it implied that the village could cure this risk through careful administrative
restrictions.27 6
Nevertheless, it seems clear that arbitrary enforcement is best prevented by clear and specific statutory drafting.2 77 Lawmakers must do
their job of writing effective criminal statutes.27 8 When President Franklin D. Roosevelt vetoed a vagrancy statute for the District of Columbia,
he observed that
[i]t would hardly be a satisfactory answer to say that the sound
judgment and decisions of the police and prosecuting officers
must be trusted to invoke the law only in proper cases. The law
itself should be so drawn as not to make it applicable to cases
2 79
which obviously should not be comprised within its terms.
This is not to say that lawmakers must draft a law that will be understood with absolute certainty in all situations.2 8 ° While no lawmaking
permits 'conviction' for almost any kind of conduct and the existence of the House of
Correction as an easy and convenient dumping ground for problems that appear to
have no other immediate solution.
Caleb Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REv.603, 631 (1956),
quoted in Papachristou,405 U.S. at 167-68.
272. See Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,
503-04 (1982).
273. 455 U.S. 489 (1982).
274. Id. at 503.
275. Id. at 504. It is important to note, however, that this case involved an economic
ordinance, not a criminal ordinance. Id. at 491, 504.
276. Id. at 503-04. Though the Court did not state that the same analysis could apply to a
criminal statute, there is no reason why a police department cannot, like any other city department, pass administrative restrictions on discriminatory and arbitrary enforcement.
277. E.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574-75 (1974) ("Legislatures may not so abdicate their responsibilities for setting the standards of the criminal law.").
278. See id.
279. H.R. Doc. No. 392, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1941), quoted in Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 167 n.10 (1972).
280. See Goguen, 415 U.S. at 581 ("There are areas of human conduct where, by the nature
of the problems presented, legislatures simply cannot establish standards with great
precision.").
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body can design a statute with this kind of mathematical precision,2 8 ' in

Kolender v. Lawson,282 the Supreme Court sent a message that
lawmakers must make the law as precise as possible.2 8 3 The Court

stated: "Although due process does not require 'impossible standards' of
clarity, this is not a case where further precision in the statutory language is either impossible or impractical."28' 4

Generally, certain factors influence how precise the wording of a
statute must be.285 First, laws that regulate individual behavior must be
more precise than laws that regulate the economy. 286 Second, statutes

that carry criminal penalties must be more precise than ones that impose
civil sanctions. 287 Third, a scienter requirement may mitigate any
problems citizens may have understanding what conduct is made criminal under a statute.288 Finally, the most important factor is whether a
law "threaten[s] to inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected
rights. '2 89 Clearly, a criminal ordinance with no scienter requirement
that regulates individual behavior related to constitutionally protected
activity demands the highest scrutiny for vagueness.290
Unlike overbreadth, defendants challenging a statute based on
vagueness must meet a stringent standing requirement. A litigant may
291
always challenge the vagueness of a statute as it is applied to himself.

A litigant cannot, under the general vagueness doctrine, challenge the
281. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972).
282. 461 U.S. 352 (1983).
283. See id. at 361.
284. Id. (citation omitted).
285. See Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,
498-99 (1982).
286. See United States v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 36 (1963); see, e.g.,
Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 498 ("[E]conomic regulation is subject to a less strict vagueness
test because its subject matter is often more narrow, and because businesses ... can be expected to consult relevant legislation in advance of action."); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S 156, 162-63 (1972) (stating that people "not in business and not alerted to the
regulatory schemes of vagrancy laws ... would have no understanding of their meaning and
impact if they read them").
287. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948); see, e.g., Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at
498-99 ("The Court has also expressed greater tolerance of enactments with civil rather than
criminal penalties because the consequences of imprecision are qualitatively less severe.").
288. Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499 ("[T]he Court has recognized that a scienter requirement may mitigate a law's vagueness, especially with respect to the adequacy of notice to
the complainant that his conduct is proscribed.").
289. Id.; see Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 391 (1979); Grayned v. City of Rockford,
408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972); Papachristou,405 U.S at 165-66 & n.8.
290. See Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 498-99.
291. See, eg., United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960); Yazoo & Miss. V. R.R. v.
Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217, 219-20 (1912); Supervisors v. Stanley, 105 U.S. 305, 311-15
(1881).
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statute based on how police will apply it to others if the statute was not
applied vaguely to that particular litigant.2 92 If a statute is vague in all of
its applications, however, a party may assert a facial challenge even prior
to specific enforcement.2 9 3
2.

The "Right to Loiter"

Constitutional freedoms associated with loitering are derived implicitly from the right to travel as guaranteed under Article IV, Section 2,294
295
from the right to freedom of association under the First Amendment,
and from the general principles of the Constitution:
The difficulty is that ...
[the] activities [of loafing and
loitering] are historically part of the amenities of life as we have
known them. They are not mentioned in the Constitution or in
the Bill of Rights. These unwritten amenities have been in part
responsible for giving our people the feeling of independence
and self-confidence, the feeling of creativity. These amenities
have dignified the right of dissent and have honored the right to
be nonconformists and the right to defy submissiveness. They
have encouraged lives of high spirits rather than hushed, suffocating silence.29 6
In Papachristouv. City of Jacksonville,2 97 the Supreme Court noted that
"[p]ersons 'wandering or strolling' from place to place have been extolled
by Walt Whitman and Vachel Lindsay."29 8 In Puerto Rico, the Court
noted, "loafing was a national virtue . . . and . . . should be encouraged. ' '299 Furthermore, loitering itself is an innocent activity in that
it does not threaten harm to others. Additionally, loitering is arguably

an act that everyone does. 3" In a penal statute, the term "loitering" is a
"trap for innocent acts" such as wandering, walking, resting, or strolling;301 there is no valid way to create a presumption that people who
loiter are doing anything wrong.
292. See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756 (1974) ("[O]ne to whose conduct a statute

clearly applies may not successfully challenge it for vagueness.").
293. Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 497 (holding that a statute is not unconstitutionally
vague on its face for lack of notice unless it is "impermissibly vague in all of its applications").
294. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2; see Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 373 U.S. 500, 505-06
(1964); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126-27 (1958).
295. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see supra notes 184-94 and accompanying text.
296. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164 (1972).
297. Id. at 156.
298. Id. at 164.
299. id. at 163.
300. Id. at 164-67.
301. Id. at 164-65, 164 n.7.
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3. The Strict Standard of Vagueness Used for Loitering Laws
In cases in which a law regulates constitutionally protected rights,
the void-for-vagueness doctrine has had particularly stringent application.3 "2 The Court's rationale is similar to that applied to the overbreadth doctrine: a vague law may force citizens to refrain from
constitutionally protected activity rather than risk prosecution. 303 When
a vague statute "abuts upon sensitive areas of [constitutional] freedoms,
it operates to inhibit the exercise of those freedoms. . . . Uncertain
meanings inevitably lead citizens to steer far wider of the unlawful zone
.. . than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly
marked.

,,3 °

In fact, over time a separate vagueness doctrine, related to the overbreadth doctrine, emerged for statutes that affect constitutionally protected activity.30 5 When constitutionally protected activity is involved,
the rules of standing under this more stringent vagueness doctrine are
closely related to the overbreadth doctrine.3"6 If a statute regulates the
exercise of any constitutional rights, a litigant may challenge a statute's
vagueness on its face as it is applied to others.30 7
The vagueness and overbreadth doctrines become difficult to distinguish when a statute encourages intrusion on First Amendment freedoms.308 A vague statute may result in police making arrests outside the
statute's permissible scope. 309 In this way, a statute's vagueness contributes to its overbreadth. 3 0 Despite this blurring between the doctrines in
302. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1965).
303. See Papachristou,405 U.S. at 165-66 ("[The infirmity the Court found was vagueness-the absence of 'ascertainable standards of guilt' in the sensitive First Amendment
area.") (quoting Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948)).
304. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972) (citations omitted).
305. See Fallon, supra note 167, at 904.
306. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 359 n.8 (1983) ("[The Court has] traditionally
viewed vagueness and overbreadth as logically related and similar doctrines.").
307. Id. In Kolender, the Court rejected the dissent's assertion that a person may not "confuse vagueness and overbreadth by attacking the enactment as being vague as applied to conduct other than his own." Id. at 370 (White, J., dissenting). The majority allowed, and
"reaffirmed," the use of overbreadth standing principles for vagueness charges to statutes that
affect constitutionally protected conduct. Id. at 361.
308. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 609 (1967).
309. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551 (1965) (finding the statute "unconstitutionally vague"). It does not follow, however, that a law that is facially unconstitutional because of
overbreadth is therefore vague. See, e.g., Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S.
947, 964-67 (1984); Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env., 444 U.S. 620, 635-39
(1980); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 215-17 (1975).
310. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358-59 n.8 (declaring that the Supreme Court has "traditionally
viewed vagueness and overbreadth as logically related and similar doctrines"); Village of Hoff-
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First Amendment cases, they nevertheless remain distinct theories.311
As they do in the overbreadth context, states have an opportunity to
find and implement limiting constructions of vague statutes.3 12 The task

of finding an instruction that solves a loitering law's constitutional
problems is formidable, however, because overbreadth and vagueness are

interrelated 313 and create a no-win situation for lawmakers. Overbroad
laws that do not clearly draw the line between constitutional and crimi-

nal behavior suffer from the same pitfalls that beset vague laws: they
permit "a standardless sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors, and

juries to pursue their personal predilections. 31 4 Loitering laws are
plagued by both vagueness and overbreadth.315 316
Judicial constructions
that eliminate overbreadth may create vagueness.

C. Fourth Amendment Concerns
The Supreme Court has recognized loitering laws' persistent and unconstitutional incursions into the Fourth Amendment.31 7 The Court,
however, has never relied solely upon the Fourth Amendment to invalidate a loitering law. 318 Rather, the cases involving loitering laws addressed by the Court have been ruled unconstitutional on other grounds.
Nevertheless, lower federal courts have invalidated loitering laws on
Fourth Amendment grounds.31 9 Therefore, an overview of Fourth
Amendment principles may prove helpful for a comprehensive understanding of how the amendment relates to loitering laws.
man Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 & i.6 (1982) ("[T]he
vagueness of a law affects overbreadth analysis.").
311. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963); see also GEOFFREY R. STONE ET
AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1043 (1986) (recognizing that "not all overbroad laws are vague

[e.g., 'No person may expressly advocate criminal conduct'], and not all vague laws are overbroad [e.g., 'No person may engage in any speech that the state may constitutionally
restrict']").
312. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520 (1972); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S.
479, 491 (1965).
313. See Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 515-17 (1964).
314. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405
U.S. 156, 170 (1972).
315. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 359 n.8 (1983).
316. See, e.g., Aptheker, 378 U.S. at 516 (construing overbroad statute to find "some core
of constitutionality would inject an element of vagueness into the statute's scope and
application").
317. See Papachristou,405 U.S. at 169-71.
318. See id. (recognizing the argument but expressly declining to decide the issue);
Kolender, 461 U.S. at 362 (Brennan, J., concurring) (same).
319. See infra notes 379-407 and accompanying text.
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1. The Fourth Amendment
In an ordered society, there is inevitably a tension between the individual's right to privacy and society's collective right to security.3 20 For
society to maintain order, government must sometimes force its citizens
to sacrifice their personal right "to the possession and control of [their]
own person[s] free from all restraint or interference of others."'3 2 ' The
Fourth Amendment was the framers' attempt to strike a balance between
societal security and individual privacy.3 22
The Fourth Amendment's general rule against unreasonable
searches and seizures is fundamental to securing individual rights: When
the police conduct a search that intrudes on an individual's expectation
of privacy, they must first obtain a warrant from a "neutral and detached
magistrate., 323 The magistrate must base the warrant on probable cause,
and he must particularly describe the person, place, or thing to be
searched.3 24 Courts have recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement only when police have no time to get the warrant, 325 but even here,
326
probable cause must exist.
Probable cause generally is required for a search or seizure to be
considered reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 327 The probable
cause requirement derived from both the language of the Fourth Amend320. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161-62 (1925); Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S.
642, 645 (1878).
321. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,9 (1968) (quoting Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250,

251 (1891)).
322. Id. at 20-21. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

323. See Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983); see also Johnson v. United States,
333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) ("[I]nferences [are to] be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate
instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting
out crime.").
324. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
325. See, e.g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509-10 (1978) (allowing immediate search
to investigate cause of a fire); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969) (permitting
search incident to an arrest); Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99
(1967) (excusing warrant requirement when police are in hot pursuit); Ker v. California, 374
U.S. 23, 42 (1963) (allowing search to prevent destruction of evidence); Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925) (upholding search of automobiles).
326. This is limited by a few exceptions. See infra notes 338-40 and accompanying text.
327. See, eg., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 214 (1979) ("For all but those narrowly defined intrusions, the requisite 'balancing' has been performed in centuries of precedent
and is embodied in the principle that seizures are 'reasonable' only if supported by probable
cause.").
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ment 328 and from the expressed intent of the framers of the Constitution.3 2 9 In Henry v. United States,3 30 the Supreme Court explained the
deep constitutional roots of probable cause:
The general warrant, in which the name of the person to be
arrested was left blank, and the writs of assistance.., both
perpetuated the oppressive practice of allowing the police to
arrest and search on suspicion. Police control took the place of
judicial control, since no showing of "probable cause" before a
magistrate was required.
Th[e] philosophy [rebelling against these practices] later
was reflected in the Fourth Amendment. And as the early
American decisions both before and immediately after its adoption show, common rumor or report, suspicion, or even "strong
reason to suspect" was not adequate to support a warrant for
arrest. And that principle has survived to this day. 33 '
The concept of probable cause has evolved from vague preliminary

definitions to specific balancing tests.332 The present treatment of probable cause is illustrated by Illinois v. Gates.333 Under Gates, probable
cause to search exists when "there is a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found" during the search.3 34 This definition,
according to the Court, is not "readily, or even usefully, reduced to a
neat set of legal rules."3'35 Consequently, the Court moved away from
seeking an all-encompassing definition of probable cause toward a more
fluid "totality of the circumstances approach" in which courts make
highly factual, individualized findings.3 36 Probable cause now is based
on whether a search will more likely than not uncover evidence of crimi328. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
329. The Framers of the Constitution included the Fourth Amendment to protect citizens
from general search warrants. Before the Revolution, general search warrants were a reality in
the American Colonies. England had enacted writs of assistance to help authorities find
American smugglers. The writs of assistance let the police search the person and belongings of
anyone whom was suspected of smuggling. The searches were completely up to the discretion
of the police.
330. 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
331. Id. at 100-01 (footnotes omitted).
332. To note the stark contrast between the Court's earlier and modem probable cause
analysis, compare Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339, 348 (1813) (stating that
probable cause "means less than evidence which would justify condemnation") with Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (holding that probable cause to search exists when "there is a
fair probability that ...evidence of a crime will be found").
333. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
334. Id. at 238.
335. Id. at 232.
336. Id. at 230-31.
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nal activity.3 37
The Supreme Court historically has recognized four exceptions to
the probable cause requirement. 3 The first three exceptions are not rel337. See id. at 244 n.13 ("[P]robable cause requires only a probability or substantial chance
of criminal activity.").
338. The first exception, approved in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), was
for suspicionless administrative inspections. Id. at 538-39 (allowing searches for administrative safety inspections without individualized suspicion). The administrative inspection exception allowed general routine searches of facilities for health and safety inspections, so long as
the inspectors obtained an administrative warrant. Id. at 540. The administrative officials
could conduct these searches without any reason to suspect that the building in question had
any code violations. See See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 546 (1967); Camara,387 U.S at
538. The Court approved these suspicionless searches only for routine health and safety inspections. Camara, 387 U.S. at 535-37. The Court reasoned that administrative agents could
conduct these searches because they were to enforce the safety codes, not for "discovery of
evidence of crime." Id. at 537. This limited exception to the probable cause requirement was
allowed for three reasons: the searches were non-personal, were the only way to enforce safety
codes, and were not used for criminal investigation. Id.
The administrative inspection exception soon grew into a second category of exceptions
that fit the three rationales set forth in Camera. Suspicionless customs and immigration
searches are now allowed, so long as they are not for criminal investigative purposes. See, e.g.,
United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1983) (holding that documents
aboard oceangoing vessels may be searched); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543,
556-57 (1976) (upholding immigration checkpoints). The Court also permits warrantless in-

spections of highly regulated industries. See, e.g., Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 604
(1981) (mining operations); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316-17 (1972) (firearms
business); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970) (liquor business).
Lower courts have approved metal detector searches at airports and important public places.
See, eg., McMorris v. Alioto, 567 F.2d 897, 901 (9th Cir. 1978) (courthouses); United States v.
Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 806 (2d Cir. 1974) (airports). In all of these cases, however, the
searches fit the rationale of Camera: non-personal searches not usedfor criminalinvestigation
that were the only way to enforce safety. Camara, 387 U.S. at 535-36. This exception obviously does not encompass loitering laws.
In New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985), the Court created a third exception to the
probable cause requirement by allowing searches and seizures based on reasonable suspicion
relating to the "special needs" of the school environment. Id. at 333. T.L.O. also held that a
teacher may search a student in the context of the school environment "when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated
or is violating either the law or the rules of the school." Id. at 342. The effect of this holding
was to substitute the reasonable suspicion standard for the probable cause standard for
searches of students by school officials. See id. at 341. The Court emphasized that the school
environment was a special place where teachers need flexibility in disciplining children and
maintaining order. Id. at 339-40. Once again, this exception was to be used only for maintaining a learning environment, and not for criminal investigation. See id. at 341 n.7 ("This case
does not address" the "legality of searches conducted by school officials in conjunction with or
at the behest of law enforcement agencies.").
The Court has since applied the T.L.O. special needs rationale in two other cases. See
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873, 880 (1987) (holding that probation officer may search
probationer's home if reasonable suspicion exists); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 720-24
(1987) (per curiam) (allowing public employers to search employees' offices for both investigations of work-related misconduct and noninvestigatory, work-related purposes). The Court
held that these were limited "special needs" exceptions from the probable cause requirement.
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evant to loitering laws, 339 and the fourth, the Terry exception, should not

alter the probable cause requirement for them. 34
In Terry v. Ohio, 34 1 the Supreme Court made an exception to the
probable cause requirement for brief, unintrusive searches based on a reasonable suspicion that the person being searched poses a threat to the
officer. 342 The Court held that a police officer may "conduct a carefully
limited search of the outer clothing of [dangerous persons] in an attempt
See Griffin, 483 U.S. at 878 (finding the exception necessary to preserve the "deterrent effect of
the supervisory arrangement"); O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 725 (allowing search to maintain the
"efficient and proper operation of the workplace"). In both of these cases, the Court acknowledged explicitly that the searches were not for law enforcement purposes and that reasonable
suspicion was a prerequisite for a search. See Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873 ("[W]e have permitted
exceptions when 'special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.' ") (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351
(Blackmun, J,concurring in the judgment)); O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 725 (stating that there are
special needs beyond law enforcement "for legitimate work-related, noninvestigatory intrusions as well as investigations of work-related misconduct"); see also Griffin, 483 U.S. at 87576, 880 (finding that a tip that probationer was keeping guns at his house provided reasonable
suspicion); O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 726 (holding that specific charges of employee misconduct
provided employer reasonable suspicion). Because these "special needs" searches may not be
used for law enforcement purposes, they do not apply to loitering laws.
Mass drug testing administered without individualized suspicion for safety-sensitive government positions also was excepted in the companion cases of National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab, 498 U.S. 656 (1989), and Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n,
489 U.S. 602 (1989). The Court's reasoning was that, although these searches are highly personal and not the only means to enforce a drug-free work environment, the societal need of
having sober employees in sensitive positions outweighed the intrusion from the searches. See
Skinner, 498 U.S. 616-17, 620-21. Thus, both Skinner and Von Raab expanded the "special
needs" exception to include suspicionless searches of employees. See Skinner, 498 U.S. at 61921; Von Raab, 498 U.S. at 665-66. The Court, however, emphasized repeatedly that the drug
tests were not administered for the purpose of criminal investigation. See Skinner, 498 U.S. at
607, 620; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 663, 666. Loitering laws do not fit within this exception
because of its non-criminal scope.
Finally, in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968), the Court created a fourth exception
involving detentions based on "reasonable suspicion." See infra notes 341-48 and accompanying text.
339. None of these exceptions to the probable cause requirement, other than a Terry
search, are relevant to loitering laws because they do not apply to criminal investigations. See
supra note 338.
340. See infra notes 341-48 and accompanying text.

341. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
342. See id. at 29-31. The test that Terry introduced essentially expanded reasonable
searches to include, in addition to those made with probable cause, frisks for weapons based on
a new reasonable suspicion standard. See id. at 30. The Court characterized reasonable suspicion as "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those
facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." Id. at 21. A police officer may not base any frisk on
a hunch or unparticularized suspicion, but only on the "specific reasonable inferences" drawn
from the facts of the case. Id. at 27. The Court cautioned that a weapons search made without
probable cause "must. . . be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation." Id. at 26. Any executed search which is not limited to the purpose of the discovery of
weapons or is not "something less than a 'full' search" is an unlawful search. Id.
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to discover weapons which might be used to assault [the police officer]." 3'43 Before conducting a search, the officer must have reasonable
344
suspicion that the person in question is both armed and dangerous.
The Court reiterated that generally a search or seizure is reasonable only
if probable cause exists, but that there are exceptions to the probable
cause requirement.3 4 5 In determining what is reasonable, one must first

"'focus upon the governmental interest which allegedly justifies official
intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interests of the private citizen,' for there is 'noready test for determining reasonableness other than
by balancing the need to search.., against the invasion which the search
...entails.' ,1346 The need to search is based on the state's interest in
protecting police officers from fatal risks.34 7 This heavy state interest
outweighs the effects of a brief search made only for the purpose of locating weapons on an individual.3 4 8
In addition to these specifically enumerated exceptions to the probable cause requirement, there is one case that does not fit into the doctrine. In Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 349 the Court
allowed police to erect roadblocks and, without suspicion, to stop motorists to check for signs of drunkenness. 350 The Court held that police did
not need individualized suspicion to conduct these limited stops. 3 5 1 This
is the only case in which the Court eliminated the individualized suspicion requirement for seizures made for criminal investigation. 3 2 The
Court, however, limited the allowable scope of the search to looking
through the window of the car. 3 The important aspect of Sitz, and the
unknown factor, is the Court's elimination of the individualized suspi343. Id. at 30.
344. Id. at 27.
345. See, eg., id. at 20 ("[I1n most instances failure to comply with the warrant requirement can only be excused by exigent circumstances.").
346. Id. at 20-21 (quoting Camera v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35, 536-37
(1967)).
347. Id. at 23. The Court recognized also that effective police officers must approach people to investigate a crime even when the officers do not have probable cause to make an arrest.
Id. at 22. It is unfair to make the police approach potentially hostile and armed suspects

without allowing them to make sure the suspects are not "armed with a weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against [them]." Id. at 23.
348. See id. at 27 (The "evaluation of the proper balance that has to be struck in this type
of case leads us to conclude that there must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for the protection of police ...
349. 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
350. Id. at 450-51.
351. Id. This case seems to be confined to motor vehicle cases; police may only briefly
detain a suspect until further evidence comes up. Id.
352. Id.

353. Id.
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cion requirement for criminal detentions. 4
Moreover, it appears that the Court in Sitz intended to keep the
individualized suspicion standard for searches more rigid than the lessthan-Terry type stops at sobriety checkpoints:
It is important to recognize what our inquiry is not about. No
allegations are before us of unreasonable treatment of any person after an actual detention at a particular checkpoint.... We
address only the initial stop of each motorist passing through a
checkpoint and the associated preliminary questioning and observation by checkpoint officers. Detention of particular motorists for more extensive field sobriety testing may require

satisfaction of an individualized suspicion standard.35

2. The Evolution of the Fourth Amendment Attack on Loitering
Laws
Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly based its analysis
of loitering laws on the Fourth Amendment, it has recognized that loitering laws implicate the Fourth Amendment. Lower courts have furthered
this recognition and have developed a body of law for analyzing loitering
laws under the Fourth Amendment.
In 1972, the Court struck down a loitering statute for vagueness in
Papachristouv. City of Jacksonville. 6 Initially, the Court held that the
statute, which was modeled after old English vagrancy laws,3 57 was unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Due Process Clause. 35 8 A subtext of the Court's "arbitrary and discriminatory" enforcement analysis
is an argument applying the Fourth Amendment to loitering laws.3 59
The Court explained that "[a]nother aspect of the ordinance's vagueness
appears when we focus, not on the lack of notice given a potential offender, but on the effect of the unfettered discretion it places in the hands
of the ... police. ' 360 To arrest a person purely on grounds that their
activity seems suspicious, "like [arresting] a person for investigation, is
foreign to our system. '361 In the United States, "[w]e allow our police to
make arrests only on 'probable cause,' a Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment standard applicable to the States as well as to the Federal Govern354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.

Id.
Id.
405 U.S. 156, 168-69 (1972).
Id. at 161; see supra notes 23-39 and accompanying text.
Papachristou,405 U.S. at 165.
See id. at 168-71.

360. Id. at 168.

361. Id. at 169.
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ment."36' 2 The doctrine and the Fourth Amendment arguments merge
when "the legislature ...set[s] a net large enough to catch all possible
offenders." 36' 3 By giving law enforcement universal probable cause,

either with a vague law or by permitting arrest on suspicion alone, loitering laws circumvent the Fourth Amendment.

The most complete Supreme Court analysis of loitering and the
Fourth Amendment is Justice Brennan's concurrence in Kolender v.
Lawson. 3 The majority invalidated a California loitering statute for
vagueness on due process grounds. 365 Because the statute violated the
Due Process Clause, the Court found it unnecessary to address the
Fourth Amendment issue.3 66 Justice Brennan argued in his concurrence
367
that he would also strike the statute on Fourth Amendment grounds.

He noted that although recently the Court had not found a statute void
under the Fourth Amendment, "we have long recognized that the government may not 'authorize police conduct which trenches upon Fourth
Amendment rights, regardless of the labels which it attaches to such

conduct.'

",368

The statute at issue in Kolender authorized the arrest of loiterers
369
who refused to give the police an adequate reason for their loitering.
The Court struck down the statute because, absent applicable exceptions,
police can arrest a suspect only when they have probable cause to believe

that he has committed or is committing a criminal act. 370 Except for
Terry stops, 3 71 police may not even temporarily detain suspects, 372 and
even during these stops the suspect is not required to answer
questions.3 7 3
362. Id. (citing Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15-17 (1948)).
363. Id. at 165 (quoting United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1875)).
364. 461 U.S. 352, 362-69 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring).
365. Id. at 361.
366. Id. at 361 n.10.
367. Id. at 362 (Brennan, J., concurring).
368. Id. at 362 n.1 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 61
(1968)). In Sibron and other cases, the question was always whether thepolice, through their
specific conduct, had violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring). The
Court never had the opportunity to decide whether "state law purporting to authorize such
conduct also offended the Constitution." Id. (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
369. Id. at 362 (Brennan, J., concurring).
370. Id. at 363 (Brennan, J., concurring); see, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200,
214 (1979) (holding that for "all but those narrowly defined intrusions, the requisite balancing
has been performed in centuries of precedent and is embodied in the principle that seizures are
'reasonable' only if supported by probable cause").
371. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-27 (1968).
372. Kolender, 361 U.S. at 363 (Brennan, J., concurring).
373. Id. at 365 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan cited Justice White's concurrence in Terry to illustrate the scope of a Terry search:
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By criminalizing failure to respond to police officers in a Terry stop,
the Kolender statute attempted to circumvent the Fourth Amendment
probable cause requirement. 37 4 The California statute in Kolender attempted to expand the Terry standard by making it a crime to not cooperate with police during a Terry search. 375 The statute did not
criminalize activity that would justify a Terry seizure; 376 rather, it made
it a crime not to answer questions in the context of a Terry stop. 37 7 This
enactment, in Justice Brennan's view, violated the Fourth
Amendment.37 8
Lower courts have followed Justice Brennan's lead in examining loitering statutes in the context of the Fourth Amendment. The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit clearly articulated two different Fourth
Amendment arguments in Powell v. Stone.379 The Powell court first main-

tained that loitering laws circumvent probable cause because they
authorize[] arrest and conviction for conduct that is no more

than suspicious. A legislature could not reduce the standard
[T]he person may be briefly detained against his will while pertinent questions are
directed to him. Of course, the person stopped is not obliged to answer, answers may

not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an arrest, although it
may alert the offi~er to the need for continued observation.
Id. (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 34 (White, J., concurring)).
374. See, e.g., id. at 366-67 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("California cannot abridge this constitutional rule by making it a crime to refuse to answer police questions during a Terry encounter, any more than it could abridge the protections of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments by
making it a crime to refuse to answer police questions once a suspect has been taken into
custody.").
375. See id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
376. To define the circumstances that justify a Terry search as criminal activity would
infringe on the Fourth Amendment one step more that the California statute in Kolender.
Indeed, to make acts which only lead to a reasonable suspicion a crime would surely be a more
drastic step than simply failing to comply completely with Terry's limitations. In both cases
the state attempts to allow an arrest based on certain activity. In the statute voided by
Kolender, the state allows an arrest for refusing to talk to the police after they have detained a
person pursuant to a Terry stop. A loitering statute would allow an arrest even if the detainee
agreed to talk because the standards for reasonable suspicion are codified as criminal activity.
A person could be arrested for activity that only provided police with reasonable suspicion;
there would be not reason to ever ask any questions, because the police could already make an
arrest (and a search pursuant to that arrest).
377. See id. at 368-69 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan argued that to allow
these types of arrests would "make a mockery" of Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 53 (1979).
Kolender, 461 U.S. at 351 (Brennan, J., concurring). In Brown, the Supreme Court held that
states may not criminalize a suspect's refusal to provide identification to police "in the absence
of reasonable suspicion." Id. at 368 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Brown, 443 U.S. at 53).
Note that where the Kolender statute only made it criminal to fail to answer police questions in the context of a Terry search, the law in Papachristouwent a step further by actually
making suspicious persons criminals.
378. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 362 (Brennan, J., concurring).
379. 507 F.2d 93, 96-97 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
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for arrest from probable cause to suspicion; and it may not accomplish the same result by making suspicious conduct a substantive offense. Vagrancy statutes do just that, for they
authorize arrest and conviction for the vagrancy offense if there
are reasonable grounds to suspect that the accused may have
committed, or if left at large will commit, a more serious
offense.38 °
In describing the second way that loitering statutes violate the probable cause requirement, the court also elaborated on the connection,
mentioned in Papachristou,between the vagueness and Fourth Amendment arguments. 38 ' A loitering law's "language is so general and vague,
the elements of the offense so obscure, that they afford no reasonable
criteria by which an officer may determine whether the ordinance has or
has not been violated."38 2 Because of this problem, "an officer cannot
'gauge justification for [vagrancy] arrests consistently with Fourth

Amendment principles.'

,383

In United States ex rel. Newsome v. Malcolm, 384 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit discussed another instance in which loitering
laws circumvent the probable cause requirement. In that case, police approached the defendant as he stood in a hallway of a building and made a
brief Terry detention to ask the suspect questions. 385 When the suspect
failed to produce identification, the police officer arrested him for loitering.38 6 Once the police officer had made an arrest, he was free to search
the defendant incident to that arrest, which he did.3 8 7 The defendant had
heroin and a hypodermic instrument in his pockets. 388 When the patrolman found the contraband, he also charged the defendant with possession of dangerous drugs389 and criminal possession of a hypodermic
380. Id. at 96.

381. Id. at 96-97.

382. Id. at 96.
383. Id. at 96-97 (quoting Hall v. United States, 459 F.2d 831, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en
bane)).
384. 492 F.2d 1166 (2d Cir. 1974), aff'd sub nom. Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283
(1975).
385. Id. at 1168.
386. Id. The loitering statute provided:
A person is guilty of loitering when he:... Loiters, remains or wanders in or about a
place without apparent reason and under circumstances which justify suspicion that
he may be engaged or about to engage in crime, and, upon inquiry by a peace officer,
refuses to identify himself or fails to give a reasonably credible account of his conduct
and purposes.

N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35(6) (McKinney 1965).
387. Malcolm, 492 F.2d at 1168.
388. Id.
389. Id.; see N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.05.
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instrument.3 9 0 The defendant was convicted of the loitering charge and
"attempted possession of dangerous drugs. ' 39 1
The elements of the loitering law at issue in Malcolm include: first,
one must be loitering, remaining, or wandering without apparent reason;392 and second, the loitering must establish "circumstances which
justify suspicion that [a person] may be engaged or about to be engaged
in crime. '393 The court noted that the grounds for arrest provided by
these two elements are even "less compelling than the reasonable and
articulable factors which are required to sustain a mere on-the-scene
frisk.,

39 4

The Malcolm court found that the loitering statute was merely a
tool that enabled police to undertake a search without probable cause.3 95
Under the loitering statute, if the police had a hunch that someone was
about to engage in criminal activity, they could arrest that person.39 6
Pursuant to that arrest, the police could subsequently search the suspect
to find any evidence of her "loitering" and use that evidence to prosecute
the defendant of the "future" crime. 39' By criminalizing suspicious behavior, the loitering law essentially circumvented the probable cause requirement for searches. 398 The Malcolm court found that this violated
the Fourth Amendment.3 9 9
More recently, two federal district courts have limited loitering statutes in recognition of conflicts with the Fourth Amendment. In Porta v.
Mayor, City of Omaha,' and Timmons v. City of Montgomery," 1 the
courts reached a similar result: Police must comply with the probable
cause and Terry standards." 2 Porta did not explicitly invalidate the
Omaha loitering statute, but it did hold that the statute could be enforced
only if it was used in compliance with Terry standards and probable
cause.41 3 Ironically, the court found that police could use the loitering
390. Malcolm, 402 F.2d at 1168; see N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.45.

391.
392.
393.
394.
(1968)).
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.

Malcolm, 402 F.2d at 1168-69; see N.Y. PENAL LAW § 110.05(6).
Malcolm, 402 F.2d at 1172-73.
Id. at 1173 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35(6)).
Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) and Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1174-75.
Id.
Id.
593 F. Supp. 863, 869 (D. Neb. 1984).
658 F. Supp. 1086, 1093 (M.D. Ala. 1987).
See Timmons, 658 F. Supp. at 1093; Porta, 593 F. Supp. at 869.
Porta, 593 F. Supp. at 869-70. The ordinance provided: "It shall be unlawful for any
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ordinance only when there "was sufficient probable cause to arrest for
the underlying crime."' But the police could already search a suspect if
they had probable cause to believe he had committed a crime, so the

loitering ordinance, as construed by the court, was essentially useless.
The Timmons court took a more direct approach, declaring the loitering statute at issue void under the Fourth Amendment. 4" Police may
arrest a person only when there is probable cause to believe that person
either is about to commit or has committed a criminal act.4" 6 The court

found that the loitering ordinance violated this constitutional requirement "by authorizing the arrest and conviction for conduct that is at
'
most suspicious. ""
The essence of these holdings is that loitering is not
criminal, but rather a prevalent activity in which the entire population

participates, so the probable cause standard cannot be attached to it.

Loitering laws sidestep the Fourth Amendment protections by allowing an arrest on less than probable cause." 8 They are useful tools for
police to make arrests that they otherwise could not make.40 9 As the

Supreme Court held in Papachristou: "A vagrancy prosecution may be
merely the cloak for a conviction which could not be obtained on the real
but undisclosed grounds for the arrest."'4
VI.

0

CAN ANY LOITERING LAW BE CONSTITUTIONAL?

The main problem with loitering laws is that they make an entirely

innocent activity the actus reus of a crime. "Loitering with intent" laws
person to loiter or prowl in a place, at a time or in a manner not usual for law abiding individuals under circumstances that warrant alarm for the safety of persons or property in the vicinity." Id. at 865 (quoting OMAHA, NEB., MUN. CODE § 20-171 (1967)).
404. Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Newsome v. Malcolm, 492 F.2d 1166, 1173 (2d Cir.
1974), aff'd sub nom. Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975)).
405. Timmons, 658 F. Supp. at 1093. The Court also found that the statute violated the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 1088. The Montgomery ordinance provided:
(a) Every person who commits any of the following acts shall be guilty of disorderly conduct, a misdemeanor:
(6) Who loiters or wanders upon the streets or from place to place without apparent reason or business and who refuses to identify himself and to account for
his presence when requested by any peace officer to do so, if the surrounding
circumstances are such as to indicate to a reasonable man that the public safety
demands such identification.
Id. (quoting MONTGOMERY, ALA., CODE § 29-15(a)(6) (1964)).
406. Id. at 1091.
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 169 (1972).
410. Id.
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narrow the scope of activity deemed criminal, but essentially have the
same problem as their predecessors. The ordinances remain impermissibly overbroad in that they have the potential to deter constitutionally
protected conduct. Furthermore, police still retain unfettered discretion
in determining who has the necessary intent to commit the crime. In
essence, by making the actus reus such broad activity, lawmakers have
eliminated the criminal act, a shortcoming exacerbated by defining innocent, common behavior as criminal.
Law enforcement agencies often rely on United States v. Sokolow4 1 1
to argue that lawful and innocent behavior can lead to lawful arrest.
Sokolow implicitly suggests, and prosecutors often argue, that the essential point of the case is that innocent activity can provide reasonable suspicion of guilt. 1 2 Even if this assertion is true, there is no reason to enact
"loitering with the intent to sell drugs" laws. If police can concoct probable cause from the 'suspicious factors' enumerated in the loitering laws,
there is no need to have loitering laws. Police could make the same arrests under existing drug laws.
If lawmakers could draft a law that conclusively connected behaving
in a certain manner with drug use, the law might survive constitutional
scrutiny. If these acts exclusively meant that a drug activity was occurring, then that type of loitering could be the actus reus of the crime; the
person performing these acts would already have done some overt criminal act toward completion of the crime. A person who knowingly performed such acts with criminal purpose would satisfy the mens rea of the
crime. Such a law would be similar to "criminal possession of burglary
tools with intent to commit burglary." The circumstances surrounding
the burglar can show conclusively that he is using the tools to break into

a building. If the alleged burglar is standing at the door of a building
that does not belong to him, if it is night, and if he possesses a crowbar
and lock pick, these factors strongly suggest that he is going to commit a
burglary but do not suggest any innocent activity. Therefore, an ordinance that criminalizes these circumstances should survive constitutional
scrutiny because it defines the criminal activity so specifically as not to
deter other constitutionally protected activity. Such a statute would also
survive Fourth Amendment scrutiny because the police would have more
than a mere suspicion that the person intended to commit a crime.
411. 490 U.S. 1 (1989). In Sokolow, the Court allowed a drug courier profile to justify
reasonable suspicion for a drug stop at an airport. The factors in the profile where similar to
those used in loitering laws. The drug courier profiles were general enough to have a "chameleon-like way of adapting to any particular set of observations." Id. at 13 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
412. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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This differs from the case of a "loitering with intent" law, because
the factors used to show intent in these laws consist of a list of acts not
exclusively, or even primarily, connected with drug use. Even if
lawmakers devise a list of factors that tie loitering conclusively to drug
use, a "loitering with intent" law is useless, because the presence of such
factors would give police notice that a suspect is more probably than not
engaging in drug-related crime. With this notice, police would have
probable cause for a violation of existing drug laws and would not need a
loitering law to make an arrest or search.
The very fact that many "loitering for the purpose of selling drugs"
laws equate "behav[ing] in such a manner as to raise a reasonable suspicion that he or she is about to engage in or is engaging in an unlawful
drug-related activity" ' 3 with intent to sell drugs demonstrates that these
laws make it a crime to act suspiciously. This is the very problem that
prompted the Supreme Court to declare older vagrancy laws unconstitutional. Other factors, such as "[b]eing a known unlawful user, possessor
or seller,"4 4 "[being at a location frequented by persons who use, possess or sell controlled substances,"4 5 "[o]ccupying a vehicle which is registered to a known unlawful drug user, possessor or seller or which has
recently involved in illegal drug-related activity," '16 and "[s]topping
[and] conversing with the occupant(s)... [of] a vehicle which is registered to a known unlawful drug user, possessor or seller or which has
been recently involved in illegal drug-related activity, '4 17 automatically
create an excuse to arrest an enormous number of innocent people. A
person with a prior conviction who lives in a poor, crime-ridden commu-

nity and who converses with car-riding friends in similar circumstances
has gone a long way toward showing intent. In fact, simply having a
prior drug record and living in a poor neighborhood may be enough to
show intent and is therefore sufficient to lead to arrest. Under the Charlotte ordinance, only one factor is required to show criminal intent.41 '
The laws that come the closest to passing constitutional muster are
those like the Fayetteville ordinance, which requires that each circumstance that is used to show that a person is "loitering for the purpose of
engaging in drug-related activity" must be committed with criminal in413. See FAYETTEVILLE, N.C., CODE § 21-55(c)(5) (1989); GREENSBORO, N.C., CODE
§ 18-46 (1989); HIGH PoIrr, N.C., CODE § 12-1-9 (1989).
414. See CHARLOTrE, N.C., CODE § 15-31 (1990).
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. Id.
418. Each of the factors are separated by the disjunctive "or," which indicates that each
factor alone is enough to demonstrate illegal intent. See id.
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tent. This version still has its shortcomings, however. What factors

would the police use to find intent before making an arrest? Would police base intent merely on their suspicion that someone will sell drugs, or
would they use the loitering law only when they had probable cause that
the person is selling drugs? Again, either standard the police use makes
"loitering with intent" laws useless. In the former case, where the standard for arrest is mere suspicion, the law is clearly unconstitutional
under the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines.4 1 9 In the latter case, any
discussion of loitering laws is moot, because police can stop and search a
suspect based on probable cause that he violated existing drug laws.
There are no factors that could possibly show probable cause of
criminal intent that would not also demonstrate probable cause of violation of existing state drug laws. Lawmakers merely attempted to change
the standard to make drug-related arrests easier for police; still, to seize
and search people without probable cause for possession of drugs is unconstitutional. After all, if police don't even have probable cause for possession of drugs, it is absurd that lawmakers could create a standard for
arrest that calls for less than probable cause. To allow lawmakers to
circumvent the constitutional requirement of probable cause by defining
probable cause as reasonable suspicion effectively would eliminate judicial review of the constitutionality of any criminal law. Lawmakers
could, by altering definitions, criminalize virtually any common, innocent activity.
VII.

CONCLUSION

"[In drug trials], the sense of justice unfortunately becomes itself
generic, and we do not care whether it is the right individual or not.
Somebody should be punished for this heinous crime. "420 Generic prejudice421 describes the result of a massive governmental and media campaign against a social ill.422 It causes jurors and judges to be prejudiced
against a defendant based on the nature of the crime with which he is
charged.42 3 The drug war, and all of the publicity that surrounds it,
"6paints a defendant with an incriminating and indelible brush."4 24 A
419. See supra notes 148-316 and accompanying text.
420. Panel One: What EmpiricalResearch Tells Us, and What We Need to Know About
Juriesand the Questfor Impartiality,Annenberg Washington Conference, 40 AM. U. L. REv.
547, 564-65 (1991) [hereinafter Panel One].
421. For a detailed discussion, see Jack C. Doppelt, Generic Prejudice: How Drug War
Fervor Threatens the Right to a FairTrial, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 821 (1991).

422. Id. at 828.
423. Id. at 824.
424. Id. at 822.
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jury's community sense of justice can become so generic that the jury is
blind to the defendant's guilt or innocence.425
Although generic prejudice usually afflicts jurors, a similar occurrence is happening with the third generation loitering laws. People are
arrested because of the way they look, where they live, and whom they
live with; they fit the "drug dealer stereotype." "Loitering with the intent to sell drugs" laws compound the generic justice problem. Once
labeled, the police can arrest and prosecute whomever they choose
merely in the name of fighting the war against drugs.
WILLIAM TROSCH

425. Panel One, supra note 420, at 564-65.

